An Analysis of Interest Expression and Land Rights Order in Rural Land Disputes

I. Research Background

(1) Problem Awareness

There is a great deal of research on land disputes, and the literature is extremely abundant. In the author's view, depending on the research focus or level of concern, it can roughly be divided into three parts:

The first part simply focuses on the phenomenon of land disputes themselves, mainly analyzing the types of disputes and their resolution strategies; such research has a strongly policy-oriented flavor. For example, Li Yuan (2007) divided rural land conflicts into use-right conflicts and ownership conflicts according to the type of rural land tenure, and regarding the causes of rural land conflicts, she believed they mainly included the stimulus of the state's pro-agriculture policies; unclear sources of land tenure; unclear boundaries and incomplete procedures; farmers lacking complete land property rights, making it impossible to protect farmers' rights and interests; the irrationality of land resources in old times; land tenure disputes caused by chaotic land development; land transfer procedures not being standardized enough; grassroots cadres lacking a sense of responsibility and working poorly; publicity and education not being in place, and farmers' weak legal awareness. Mei Donghai (2008) divided rural land conflicts into five categories based on the subjects of conflict: the first category is farmer—farmer or village—village, the second category is farmer—village small group (the collective owner of the land), the third category is farmer—grassroots organizations and cadres, the fourth category is farmer—higher-level government and land authorities, and the fifth category is farmer—capital holders.

The second part looks at the current rural land problem from a more macro-level perspective, with the research focus on the major issue of rural land system reform. Many scholars believe that the solution to the rural land problem and even the “three rural issues” depends on establishing a fair and efficient rural land system. For example, Wen Guanzhong (2008), Yang Xiaokai (2002), Zhou Qiren (1995), Zhang Wuchang (2004), and Mao Yushi (2009) believed that, with regard to the current agricultural land system, because land legally still belongs to the state or the collective, while what represents the state and the collective is again governments at all levels, the non-market allocation of the land factor makes it difficult to achieve optimal economic and social results, and the direction of reform is to define farmers' increasingly full rights to land. Of course, there is also another different line of reform thinking. A representative voice is Yao Yang (2000), who, starting from the social security function of land, believed that at present in vast rural China, the government is not yet capable of establishing an effective social security system, and the current egalitarian agricultural land system characterized by equal land distribution is, in terms of providing social security for the rural population, an effective substitute for cash-based social security. Wen Tiejun (2008) held a similar view, believing that the bottom line of China's rural land reform is not to carry out land privatization.

The third part consists of research from a sociological perspective, mostly concentrated on describing and explaining phenomena in land disputes or conflicts, with its emphasis on the social constraining factors after the distribution of rights and interests, such as social structure, cultural customs, and village authority, pointing out the historical nature and complexity of real land disputes. For example, Zhang Jing (2003) believed that, under conditions in which the political field and the legal field have not been separated, in current rural land disputes the process of choosing land use rules politicizes legal events. Therefore, land use rules are uncertain as interests and forces change. Cao Zhenghan (2008), through research on mudflat disputes in the Pearl River Delta, reached a view similar to Zhang Jing's. In addition, Shen Jing and Wang Hansheng (2005), taking a village in central Sichuan Province as the research object, explored the grassroots practical logic of collective property rights existing in rural society, believing that from a sociological perspective property rights relations are not, as economists assume, a clearly divided and relatively stable relational structure once formed. On the contrary, it is a process of continuous interaction between individual actors and the social environment in which they are situated, and from a sociological perspective the structure of property rights relations appears as a dynamic equilibrium process. Zhe Xiaoye and Chen Yingying (2000), using the variable of “choice structure,” mainly studied several “super villages” in developed coastal areas, believing that because there was an internal relationship between the various conditions these villages faced at the time of reform and their choice strategies, the phenomenon emerged that every village had its own property rights model.

From the above literature review, research on rural land disputes themselves is too fragmented, while macro-oriented research on the land system finds it difficult to explain the complexity of real rural land disputes, whereas research from a sociological perspective provides us with many inspirations for understanding the current rural land rights order and even land disputes. Prasenjit Duara (2010: 207) believed that only when state power successfully integrates its own authority and interests into the cultural network can it truly and effectively achieve governance of rural society. Compared with the strong transformation of rural society by state power in the 20th century, state power building in the new era should better combine the logic of the countryside itself in order to establish a rural land system that can withstand the test of practice. Therefore, the question this paper wants to answer lies in how people in rural land disputes protect their own interests, and where the basis of legitimacy for their interest claims lies.

(2) Case Overview

The case materials in this paper mainly come from the author's field investigation in X Village. In February 2010, the author conducted in-depth investigation of a land dispute case in the village that had lasted four or five years, mainly interviewing active participants on both sides, such as old Party members in the community, members of the village small group organizing committee, and new and old members of the village committee leadership. Most of the case materials are interview records; in addition, there are various written materials provided by both parties, including agreements, government documents, and court judgments.

X Village is located in western Jiangxi Province, under C Township, S County, P City. The old National Highway 319 passes through the village from south to north. It is 20 km north of the county seat and 18 km south of the urban area, with very convenient transportation. It is the location of the township government office and is also the township's economic and cultural center. The village has a population of about 2,000, with a per capita annual income of about 4,000 yuan; per capita cultivated paddy field is 0.5 mu, plus a small amount of dry land (vegetable plots) for each household; with many people and little land, sidelines such as fireworks, working away from home, and breeding have become the source of villagers' net income. The 14th village small group under the village, commonly known as “Luxia” (this term is used below), has villagers divided into more than 60 households and more than 300 people, and is the village small group with the largest population in X Village. Among them, villagers surnamed Huang make up more than 90%. Most residents of Luxia Group are distributed along the hill slopes south of Highway 319, with houses built in two rows according to the terrain. As the rural economy became more active, cultivated land in Luxia located in the central area of the township was converted into commercial facilities and housing. The village office building is located in this central area, and the dispute arising around the land occupied by the village office building (abbreviated as the X-L plot) occurred here.

The land dispute between X Village and Luxia Group can be traced back to before Liberation. Before 1949, the X-L land belonged to and was operated by the Huang clan of Luxia. After Liberation, after undergoing land reform and the collectivization movement, the land became collective land of the Luxia production team, and this situation continued until 1976. Afterward, because the former Luoxin Brigade[①] built a comprehensive office and commercial building on this land, according to the agreement reached by both sides at the time, Luoxin Brigade compensated Luxia production team with 1,700 jin of grain each year, without specifying a compensation period. From 1977 to 1987, Luoxin Brigade provided compensation for a total of 11 years. During this period, in 1986, the C Township People's Government issued a document stipulating that land used for village public welfare undertakings could be offset and balanced in the village's cultivated land transferred out through “agricultural-to-non-agricultural” conversion. In early 1988, X Village occupied the commercial office building and put up its plaque to work there, and on the grounds of the 1986 township government document and the apportionment by the former Luoxin Brigade, refused to continue compensating the land occupation fee. However, the villagers of Luxia Group expressed opposition, and therefore often organized some villagers to obstruct the daily work of the village committee. By 1995, Luxia Group brought X Village Committee to the people's court of the S District (County) to which it belonged, demanding that the defendant compensate 13,923.00 yuan for the land occupation fee for the comprehensive building (from 1988 to 1994), and demanding that the defendant continue to perform the compensation agreement. The district court ruled that the plaintiff lost the case, and later the P City Intermediate People's Court upheld the original judgment[②].

In 2004, because the village office building had long been in disrepair, X Village Committee decided to demolish it and build a new commercial office building on the original site. In December, X Village signed an agreement with Luxia Group to compensate 30,000 yuan, and additionally gave Luxia Group 10,000 yuan for the demolition fee of the village office, stipulating that from then on there would be no dispute between the two and no going back on it; but on the last day of the year, villagers from Luxia Group still came to the site to obstruct, and the auction organized by the village building group fell through. In January 2005, the village committee, without negotiation through meetings of Party members, group leaders, and village representatives, signed an agreement to sell the old village office buildings and land to the C Township Education Foundation for 480,000 yuan. After Luxia Group failed in negotiations with the foundation, it opposed X Village Committee's resale of the land and organized villagers to report the situation to higher authorities. From 2005 to 2008, because the C Township Education Foundation failed to reach an agreement with Luxia Group, it was never able to start construction. In November 2008, X Village Committee held elections and changed its leadership. Through the efforts of the new village committee leadership, in February 2009, the C Township Education Foundation agreed to transfer the former site of the X Village office building to X Village Committee for construction. In March, after negotiation between X Village Committee and Luxia Group, they agreed to compensate the other party 80,000 yuan, stipulating that from then on there would forever be no dispute between the village and the group, and never any going back on it. After more than two months of construction, the new X Village office and commercial building was completed.