Maintain the half-work half-farming self-circulation system well, and rural stability will be guaranteed

Who will farm the land? Probably no other modern major country cares about this issue as much as China does. The judgment reached after synthesizing information from all sides is that this problem has developed to a very severe degree and must be solved quickly; the method is to support family farms, encourage capital to go to the countryside, develop large-scale operations, and build modern agriculture. In the above line of thinking, the small-peasant economy is truly repugnant, incompatible with modernization, and must be eliminated as quickly as possible.

"Who will farm the land" has become a problem, and responsibility has even been pushed onto small peasants. In my view, this is truly the greatest misunderstanding of the national conditions of agriculture, rural areas, and farmers. This understanding, built on a misreading of the actual situation, separates the agricultural problem from the complete system of the three rural issues and modernization. Decision-making practice guided by this understanding may trigger systemic chain reactions due to partial blind action.

Here I want to combine the main understandings of the Huazhong Village Governance Research group on this issue in recent years to discuss the relationship between the current agricultural operation model and farmers' livelihoods and the urbanization process, analyze how it constitutes a benign self-circulation mechanism in rural society, and thereby makes the countryside a stabilizer and reservoir for modernization, and finally reveal the institutional foundation of this model and reflect on how current theory and policy practice dissolve this foundation.

Family division of labor

Who in today's countryside is actually farming the land? The general understanding in society is the so-called “386199” army, namely women, the elderly, and children. The labor quality of the old, weak, women, and children is relatively low, and having them operate agriculture will inevitably be inefficient. This is a misunderstanding of the existing agricultural operation model, a manifestation of lacking basic common sense, and a treatment of the rural left-behind population as the main force in agricultural production. Their first mistake is to substitute field management for the entire agricultural production process. In fact, during the most intense stages of rushing to plant and harvest, most of the labor force working outside the village (especially middle-aged people) returns to the countryside. During busy farming seasons, the lively scene of voices filling the village is no less impressive than during the Spring Festival. The second mistake is failing to see the improvement in agricultural productivity. Agricultural production is no longer maintained mainly through the previous method of labor-intensive “involutionary” input. The mechanization and chemicalization of agriculture have already reached a fairly high level. Except for a few mountainous areas where cultivation is inconvenient, the intensity of labor in most agricultural regions has been greatly reduced, and the demands of field management on labor quality are not high. If the agricultural machinery extension system were complete, the old, weak, women, and children could manage it even better than now. The third mistake is believing that this small-peasant operation is inefficient. Measured by the input of labor and time and energy, small-peasant operation is indeed much more extensive than traditional intensive cultivation, but the massive input of scientific and technological factors can compensate for this. China's eleven consecutive years of grain increases were precisely built on an operation model dominated by small-peasant operation. For more than ten years, it has been the old, weak, women, and children operating agriculture; saying they are inefficient cannot explain consecutive years of grain production increases. Therefore, the real situation is that the current agricultural operation model is household operation based on mechanization and chemicalization, with generational division of labor and gender division of labor: young and middle-aged labor participates in the most arduous stages of rushing to plant and harvest, while the old, weak, women, and children are responsible for the lighter field management.

Since the rural reforms of the 1980s, this household operation based on generational division of labor and gender division of labor has operated stably for more than thirty years. The external condition for its formation is that after reform and opening up, the export-oriented industrialization development strategy drove the rapid development of processing and manufacturing, and demand for labor continuously increased. At this time, agricultural productivity also developed to a fairly high level, releasing a large amount of labor, and a livelihood model combining off-farm work and farming was able to form and continuously develop. In recent years, infrastructure construction, which has continuously received huge investment to stimulate economic growth, has provided broad employment space for large numbers of middle-aged farmers, and the rapid development of the tertiary industry has likewise created many employment opportunities. This roughly formed the pattern of young couples entering factories, middle-aged men going to construction sites, and middle-aged women or middle-aged couples engaging in the tertiary industry as they went to the cities for work. In addition, off-farm income has already far exceeded agricultural returns, further consolidating the combined livelihood model based on family division of labor. We call this model “half-work half-farming based on generational division of labor.”

It can be seen that the half-farming half-work model was historically formed, had objective conditions both internal and external, and is a livelihood method autonomously created by farmers based on survival rationality under the existing economic structure and institutional environment. It fully utilizes the ethical culture of the Chinese-style family and realizes the optimal allocation of labor resources within the household. Although it is not without the sacrifice of intergenerational exploitation, on the whole it safeguards and promotes family succession. Specifically, its economic significance lies in the fact that the income from agriculture operated by the old, weak, women, and children can basically cover daily household living expenses (calculated as 1-2 ten-thousand yuan in annual agricultural income for an ordinary farming household), and can be called a survival guarantee fund. Young and middle-aged labor going to the cities to work accumulates the most important wealth resource for family development, and this can be called a development guarantee fund. For the vast majority of ordinary farming households, neither can be missing. Without the development guarantee fund, the economic situation of small-scale pure farming households becomes relatively difficult, and their status in the village becomes relatively marginal. Without the survival guarantee fund, the development guarantee fund will be diluted, which is likewise unfavorable for family development. In addition, for the old, weak, women, and children, there is almost no space for them to work in the cities, employment opportunities are very limited, and they can basically only be pure consumers. If they rashly enter the cities, household living costs will inevitably rise greatly; staying in the countryside, they can still engage in production and create wealth and save a large amount of living costs. This implicit income is likewise indispensable to small-peasant households. Its social significance lies in the fact that, for people left behind in the village, farming arranges the rhythm of life, and routine, fragmented field management forcibly makes them labor, which is not without benefit for maintaining physical and mental health. For some elderly people still capable of labor, they have deep feelings for the land; agricultural labor not only helps exercise the body but is also an emotional attachment. When rural leisure life is generally hollowed out, farming is truly a very meaningful thing and can in a sense be regarded as a kind of “leisure.” Seasonal busy farming periods can also in fact forcibly bring about family reunion, making young and middle-aged people, especially middle-aged people, have to return home once every so often. Although the steps are hurried and the stay is very short, the positive role in promoting family reunion cannot be ignored. The dual guarantees at the economic and social levels give farmers ample space for choice and allow them to autonomously arrange the rhythm and method of settling in the city according to family development conditions. The general pattern is that the whole family pools its strength to buy a house in the city for the children, while parents and the elderly continue to adopt the half-work half-farming model to channel resources to the children who have moved to the city (even including living materials such as rice and vegetables). If the children succeed through struggle, in good cases they can bring their parents into the city to enjoy their later years; in ordinary cases each can find their proper place; if they encounter setbacks, they can still return to the countryside. As long as age permits, this advance and retreat can be repeated several times, until finally entering the city or having to retreat back to the countryside. Farmers' entry into the cities cannot be achieved overnight, but is a process inevitably marked by setbacks and repetitions, and may require the relay of two or even several generations to complete. The half-work half-farming model based on generational division of labor is precisely the key mechanism supporting this family relay.

Class structure and social stability

In the process of forming and stabilizing, the half-farming half-work model has already become highly matched with the economic, social, and even political structure of rural society, becoming an important micro-foundation for regulating the pace of urbanization and maintaining rural social stability. Every household makes rational decisions to determine the scale of agricultural operation, thereby forming spontaneous land transfers in rural society. Some households have limited labor capacity among the old, weak, women, and children and have to reduce or give up farming income, so they release part of their land. Some households may have relatively considerable off-farm income (especially those successful in business) and may shrink or even give up farming, so they release part of their land. Some households successfully move away as a whole because family members enter school, enter politics, or for other reasons, and they also release part of their land. The first two types account for a relatively large proportion; although the latter is not numerous, it is an inevitable phenomenon in the urbanization process. This released land is generally transferred, through private discussion, free of charge or at low rent, to relatives and friends in the village for cultivation. Among the households that take in this land, some cannot go out as a whole family for various reasons but have the ability to expand operation scale through mechanization and scientific and technological means; others similarly can expand scale because the housewives or elderly have relatively strong labor capacity. After taking in the land of relatives and friends, they can bring their own operation scale to thirty to fifty mu or even one hundred mu, obtain economic income roughly equivalent to that of combined-occupation farming households, and likewise obtain relatively respectable social status in the village. Because spontaneous transfers are almost entirely based on the personal relations of a society of acquaintances (especially close personal relations), trust is very high. When transferring households want their land back, public breaches of agreement (even though the agreement is oral) rarely occur. Our extensive investigations have never found such cases. This informal, personalistic spontaneous transfer realizes orderly transfer and effective use of land within the village (that is, within the unit of collective land ownership), and quietly reconstructs the class structure of rural society, giving rise to a grassroots class we call “backbone farmers” (which may be abbreviated as the “middle-farmer class”). The middle-farmer class refers to households that rely on taking in land to form scale benefits, thereby obtaining economic income roughly equivalent to (or even better than) that of combined-occupation farming households. Such households are not numerous; according to our statistics, they account for about one-tenth of the village population, but they constitute the backbone of rural society. They are mostly between 40 and 60 years old, precisely the golden age for engaging in agricultural production. The main social relations and life orientation of this group are within the village. They are currently the group most closely tied to village interests, hold deep feelings for agricultural production and rural life, have a certain enthusiasm for village stability and development, and have a high degree of identification with the state's beneficial agriculture policies. They are the most core and stable force in rural society at present and for a fairly long period to come.

We can make a simple comparison between the middle-farmer class and other classes to analyze why this class has special significance for the stability of rural society. First, consider combined-occupation households. The group that works away from the village year-round only returns during the Spring Festival, and the time spent in the village is too short; the group that works away seasonally spends a relatively longer time in the village, but its participation is constrained by the rhythm of going out and it cannot devote itself fully. Second, consider non-farming households. Even if non-farming households that have moved out of the village are enthusiastic about village public welfare affairs, their participation and influence are extremely limited; industrial and commercial operators are tied down by business, have limited time and energy, and their interests are weakly connected to the village (while highly connected to markets and society outside the village); retired veteran cadres and others may have ample time and may also be very responsible and enthusiastic, but they may lack rural social experience, and advanced age is also a constraint. Third, consider small households and disadvantaged groups. This group has difficulty even taking care of itself, let alone participating in public affairs. The advantages of the middle-farmer class are reflected in three aspects. First, rich production experience and strong production capacity. Farmers in this group have always engaged in agricultural production, hold deep feelings for the land, and have accumulated rich production experience. With the assistance of small machinery and the input of scientific and technological factors, they can maximize scale benefits through household operation. Second, rich life experience and high social prestige. Spontaneous transfer has the function of selecting elites. Only those folk elites with relatively abundant social capital in the village can most gain people's trust. They rely on prestige capital accumulated by following local norms, and therefore are also the most steadfast defenders of local norms. They not only must personally honor agreements, but when facing behavior that damages village morality and order, they can also step forward and uphold justice. Third, close ties to village interests and strong social participation. They are in the village year-round, are most closely tied to village interests, and are most concerned about village affairs. Moreover, relatively high economic income and the characteristics of agricultural production also provide them with the time and energy to participate in village governance. They are currently the main source of village governance elites.

The formation of the middle-farmer class is a social force endogenous to rural society in response to urbanization and modernization, and is the result of spontaneous land transfer among farming households under collective land ownership. This transfer is reversible, will not repeat the historical tragedy of land concentration under private ownership, and promotes the cyclic regeneration of the class structure within rural society. Specifically, the scale of a farming household's land operation adjusts with the family life cycle and the rhythm of entering the city. When going to the city for work goes relatively smoothly, part or even all of the land can be transferred to others for cultivation. As age increases and the labor advantage disappears, and without enough capital to establish a foothold in the city, they can retreat to the countryside, take the land back, and continue agricultural operation. Although they cannot become wealthy, they can at least guarantee basic survival. For young people, they always have more romantic and optimistic expectations of the city and lack rational understanding of farming. In earlier years they are more inclined to give the land to their parents or simply transfer it out. Likewise, as age increases, reality teaches them how to arrange life more rationally. By middle age, they can take back part or all of the land for cultivation and place the hope of entering the city on the next generation. Under normal circumstances, this kind of land intake and release unfolding according to the life cycle (which is also the labor decline cycle) will form scale effects in the village, and the relatively free transfer model can also better protect the interests of all parties. Many people believe that the lack of fixed contracts and fixed terms is unfavorable for protecting the interests of both transferors and transferees, but the problem is that once land transfer is institutionalized and fixed, it will inevitably squeeze out the space for farmers' autonomous adjustment, which is instead unfavorable.

Maintaining the self-circulation system well

In recent years, academic circles and government departments have been keen to promote the construction of a new agricultural operation system. Their starting point is naturally dissatisfaction with the current agricultural operation system. This view obviously fails to notice that rural society has already spontaneously generated an internal circulation mechanism with considerable vitality, fails to notice the important significance of the combined-occupation model for farmers, fails to notice the important value of the rise of the middle-farmer class for rural social stability, solves the problem of agricultural modernization one-sidedly from the angle of economic efficiency, and seriously underestimates the relationship between agriculture and rural areas and farmers and even the entire modernization system.

The so-called cultivation of new agricultural operation entities, according to our investigation, mainly consists of two types: one is enterprise operation with industrial and commercial capital as the main body, and the other is family farms. Capital going to the countryside to transfer land is the most convenient way to “build large households.” With the support of local governments, powerful industrial and commercial enterprise owners contract thousands or even tens of thousands of mu of land at every turn. The scale cannot be called small, and this has continued for several years. There are two types of capital going to the countryside to operate agriculture: one is developing new characteristic agriculture and sightseeing agriculture, and the other is engaging in traditional planting. The former has high profits and high risks, while the latter is basically difficult to make profitable. New agriculture is destined to be impossible to generalize. First, the market is limited; second, it is unfavorable for food security. But it most easily becomes a project for political achievements and often becomes a “highlight” of local government agricultural work. The profits of traditional planting are too low. More critically, the management cost and management efficiency of enterprises operating large-area grain crops are too low, and their ability to cope with natural disasters and market risks is also relatively low. They simply cannot compare with small-peasant household operation, and their grain yield per mu generally declines. In our investigations we have not found any enterprise that makes money growing grain; without exception they survive on various government subsidies (as well as other exchanges of interests). Capital going to the countryside will cause major interest restructuring in rural society, carries great uncertainty, and poses a challenge to China's basic agricultural operation system. By contrast, family farms seem much more prudent. They are still based on supporting household operation, and their “new” significance lies in the fact that the operation scale is larger than that of small peasants but still controlled within the capacity of household operation. The specific scale differs according to local natural and geographical conditions, the state of agricultural infrastructure, and the level of input of scientific and technological factors. Now, identifying, supporting, and cultivating family farms has become the focus of local governments in building a new agricultural operation system. On the surface, family farms and middle farmers are very similar, both being household operations of moderately scaled land. The crux is that middle farmers and small peasants coexist symbiotically in rural society, and they can transform into each other through spontaneous land transfer. This is a dynamic class structure. Once family farms become the operation entities mainly promoted by administrative power, agricultural policy, including input of agricultural funds, undergoes a major shift. Small peasants then become the opposite of family farms, and the dynamic class structure is very likely to be solidified. Rural society had already spontaneously formed a class structure full of vitality and quite efficient, matching the operation model and population mobility. In the process of tremendous change, the value of having this dynamic stable structure cannot be ignored. Why insist on forceful intervention and causing unnecessary risks?

⟦NL> To summarize the discussion in this article, the half-farming half-work livelihood model adopted by farmers, based on division of labor within the household (generational division of labor and gender division of labor), is the rational choice of a family relay-style repeated process of entering the city. It has given rise to spontaneous land transfer in rural society and reorganized the rural class structure centered on the rise of the middle-farmer class. The dynamic and benignly circulating class structure is favorable for rural social stability. The key link is the existence of spontaneous land transfer. On the one hand, it effectively allocates land resources within the scope of collective land ownership; on the other hand, it also allows rural society to maintain basic vitality under the net loss of people, goods, and money. The focus of agriculture-related policy at present and for a fairly long period to come should be, based on the above situation and changes, to protect the self-circulation system of rural society, for example by strengthening the regulatory power of collective ownership in order to enhance the efficiency of state resources going to the countryside. In short, only by maintaining well the rural social self-circulation system built on the half-work half-farming livelihood model and spontaneous land transfer can the countryside better play the role of stabilizer and reservoir in the modernization process, and only this is a long-term solution.