Keeping a Close Watch on Rural "Three Assets" Requires Tightening the Institutional "Iron Cage"
As the rural economy continues to develop, the scale of rural collective funds, assets, and resources has also been increasing. However, for a long time, the management of rural “three assets” in many places has been non-standard and incomplete, gradually becoming an area prone to frequent grassroots corruption. Recently, in Jishou City, which is under the administration of Xiangxi, a village cadre, after being investigated for embezzling public funds, still confidently retorted: “I became a village cadre just to grab a little something, how is that illegal?” (October 28, People's Daily)
At present, reports of village cadres violating discipline are frequently seen in the press. The “tiny officials” who should have led the people to prosperity either transform into “local emperors” amassing wealth, or become “underworld bosses” dominating the market, showing no regard for the interests of the people, seriously damaging the image of grassroots cadres and losing the fairness of the Party and the government. Moreover, the numerous disorders in rural “three assets” management are widely criticized by the masses. In my view, keeping a close watch on rural “three assets” requires tightening the institutional “iron cage.”
As is well known, grassroots cadres, as the “last mile” of the nerve endings of national governance, are seen by rural residents as the spokespersons of the Party and the government. During the mass line education and practice activities, many places across the country carried out concentrated rectification of rural “three assets” management issues, and “three assets” management is entering an effective regulatory track. However, in some rural areas, “three assets” management has lacked coordination for many years, with countless disorders. In some villages, the accountant and cashier roles are not separated, with accounts, money, and power all controlled by the village Party secretary alone; in some villages, collective assets often flow to the village cadres' connections, while ordinary villagers do not know, do not ask, and cannot ask; in some villages, collective resources become the village cadres' own resources, with how much there is, where it is, and who is using it all being a murky account. Many rural petition incidents originate from chaotic rural “three assets” management.
⟦NL> There is no doubt that due to the complexity of rural work, the phenomenon of village officials violating regulations and laws has always been a persistent difficult problem plaguing rural work. Rural “three assets” have always been a hot topic of concern for farmers and the focus of rural petitions. If not managed well, they will become a point of conflict and a fuse. Practicing the mass line requires clearing up rural “three assets” and presenting the masses with a “clear account.” However, from an institutional perspective, village cadres under villager self-governance generally do not have the same “rules and restrictions” as civil servants, which emboldens these village officials to do as they please, even controlling the entire village's “book of life and death.” From a legal and regulatory perspective, the implementation of the Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees is not optimistic, causing good systems such as villagers' meetings to become mere formalities.
Therefore, strong medicine is needed to keep a close watch on rural “three assets,” and long-term effectiveness must be emphasized, installing an “iron cage” over the power of “village officials.” We can explore full coverage of rural grassroots disciplinary inspection organizations and strengthen disciplinary and institutional constraints on village cadres. On this basis, publicly disclose Party affairs and village affairs in the village bulletin board every quarter, disclose financial management and usage on the government website, send mass text messages to villagers to inform them of all major and minor village affairs, and carry out year-end activities for village cadres to report on their work and integrity, making village-level affairs management standardized, institutionalized, and transparent, allowing the power in the hands of village cadres to operate in a regulated manner. At the same time, implement term audits for village cadres. Before leaving office, each term of village cadres must hand over a “clear account” and promptly make it public to accept social supervision.
In my view, keeping a close watch on rural “three assets” requires tightening the institutional “iron cage.” The frequent occurrence of village official corruption questions whether the institutional “iron cage” is effective and also sounds a “warning bell” for regulatory authorities. Only by making all systems into “tightening bands” and “iron cages,” and regulating power under the system, can we effectively supervise rural collective “three assets” and truly create a harmonious rural environment with clean air and upright spirit.