How to tackle rising farmland transfer prices through guidance and policy?
These days, the joy of the New Year's arrival seems invisible on the faces of those who transfer farmland; what worries them is that the days of growing grain on transferred farmland are no longer easy. Nowadays the purchase price of grain has approached the "ceiling," while the transfer price of farmland seems to rise ever higher, like a sesame stalk shooting upward.
A few years ago, the transfer price of ordinary farmland was around 500 yuan, but now it has risen to 700 to 800 yuan, and in some cases even exceeds 1,000 yuan. According to statistics from relevant departments, at present farmers' net income per mu of land is only 682 yuan. If the transfer price of farmland continues to rise, those who originally transferred farmland to grow grain crops will have to switch to growing other crops, or reduce their numbers or even withdraw from the ranks of transferees.
The rigid growth of China's grain consumption requires that grain production must continue to increase. Not long ago, the State Council issued the "Several Opinions on Establishing and Improving the Provincial Governor Responsibility System for Food Security," which made clear that each provincial-level government has the "duty to guard its territory" in safeguarding national food security, and further clarified the provincial governors' authority and responsibilities in all links of grain production, circulation and consumption. However, in implementing the provincial governor responsibility system for food security, developing new types of agricultural business entities such as large grain-growing households, family farms and farmers' professional cooperatives remains a key measure for promoting grain production. Without moderate-scale operation, it is very difficult for grain production to continue increasing yields and achieving bountiful harvests.
To cope with the continuously rising cost of farmland transfer, efforts should be made in three aspects: guidance and policy.
Strengthen guidance
As an indispensable grain commodity for people's three meals a day, its market price cannot rise without limit. China implements a minimum purchase price for grain in major grain-producing areas, which, although it has played a positive role, now faces problems that cannot be avoided and urgently need solving. The most obvious is that domestic grain prices are far higher than those on the international market, and large quantities of low-priced foreign grain have poured into China, causing the domestic "policy market" to result in more and more grain purchased by the state, ever-growing stockpiles, and increasingly poor sales.
Against the backdrop of global economic integration, if things are not done in accordance with the laws of the market economy, problems that cannot be ignored will emerge. At the end of last year, the state made clear that the 2015 minimum purchase price for wheat would remain at the 2014 level of 1.18 yuan per jin. This reflects from one side the high importance that the state's top leadership attaches to adjusting grain policy, and from another side it also reflects that China's minimum grain purchase price cannot rise without limit.
At present, China's basic policy on farmland transfer is "lawful, voluntary and compensated." Under this premise, governments at all levels cannot use administrative means to intervene in farmers' farmland transfer. However, strengthening guidance is feasible. It is necessary to help farmers who transfer farmland calculate three accounts clearly: how much money can they earn in a year by growing grain crops themselves? Apart from paying the transfer fee, how much money can others earn from the transferred farmland? Through win-win cooperation between both sides, how much money can be earned per mu of land? Only when the farmland transfer fee is moderate can the farmland be transferred out; only when the farmland is transferred out can labor be freed up to engage in other work and earn more money; only through moderate-scale operation of farmland can grain cultivation give equal weight to both economic and social benefits.
Provide subsidies
Given the existing grain production capacity, in large-scale grain operations, even if the farmland transfer price is moderate, the profits obtained by transferees are negligible. If this continues over time, the "de-agriculturalization" and "de-grainization" of transferred farmland will be unavoidable.
To enable new types of agricultural business entities such as large grain-growing households, family farms and farmers' professional cooperatives to grow grain crops without hesitation, a very important method is to provide subsidies to those who grow grain on a large scale. In 2014, Tongshan District of Xuzhou City, Jiangsu Province, issued a policy under which the district finance department gives a subsidy of 100 yuan per mu per year to large grain-growing households who transfer more than 100 mu of land with a transfer term of no less than 10 years.
One benefit of adopting the subsidy method is that it makes up for the inadequacy of grain-growing subsidies and improved-seed subsidies. China's current grain-growing subsidies and improved-seed subsidies for farmers are not directed to new types of agricultural business entities such as large grain-growing households, family farms and farmers' professional cooperatives. In this regard, in addition to subsidies given by local governments, the national finance authorities should also issue subsidy policies. A second benefit is that it increases the income of new grain production entities. When the market price of grain is fixed, if the government does not give subsidies to those who operate grain on a large scale, their enthusiasm for growing grain will inevitably decline, thereby affecting grain production. A third benefit is that it stabilizes market grain prices. With a certain amount of large-scale operation subsidies, large-scale producers can sell grain commodities at the appropriate time according to market conditions, and market grain prices may then tend toward stability.
Grain sales subsidies
If grain prices cannot be raised year after year, yet the income of large-scale grain growers can still increase steadily, implementing grain sales subsidies is a good approach.
Following the principle of "whoever sells grain gets the subsidy," grain-selling farmers in Ordos City, Inner Mongolia, as long as they hold a certificate of self-produced grain from the township government and a formal purchase receipt from a state-owned grain purchasing enterprise, can receive a subsidy of 0.1 yuan for every 1 kilogram of grain sold, based on actual sales. Subsidy funds are uniformly paid directly to farmers selling surplus grain in the form of a "one-card" system.
The benefits of implementing the grain sales subsidy method: First, it solves the drawback that "growing more or less is all the same." Those who grow more grain receive more subsidies, and otherwise receive less. Second, it solves the drawback that "growing or not growing is the same." In many places in China, grain subsidies are implemented according to the tax-assessed area, and subsidies are given the same whether grain is grown or not. Third, it solves the drawback that "high or low yields are all the same." When subsidies are based on planted area, some farmers engage in extensive management and, regardless of yield levels, cause waste of resources. Fourth, it solves the drawback that "selling more or less grain is all the same." In a certain sense, safeguarding national food security means that the whole society can have enough commodity grain each year to meet consumption. Implementing grain sales subsidies can encourage grain producers to produce more grain and sell more grain.
The promotion of grain sales subsidies will have a profound impact on encouraging the emergence of more new large-scale grain operation entities, solving the difficult problem of "no one grows grain," achieving coordinated urban-rural development, and ensuring national food security.