Long-term rural land use rights should be realized as soon as possible
On July 10, 1998, the Rural Land Policy Research Group of the China Institute for Reform and Development (CIRD) submitted this proposal to the relevant departments and leaders of the Central Committee and the State Council. It coincided with the preparatory period for the Third Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee of the Party, and immediately attracted great attention from the relevant leaders. When drafting the "Decision" of the Third Plenary Session, they referred to this article and directly adopted the important viewpoint of "granting farmers long-term and guaranteed land use rights."
The first round of land contracting in China's rural areas, which began in 1984 with a 15-year unchanged term, has now successively expired. In many places, in accordance with the spirit of the Central Committee, the second round of land contracting work is being carried out to "extend land contracting for 30 years without change." The Central Committee's policy of a "30-year land contracting period" is a major measure to accelerate rural economic reform and maintain long-term stability in rural policy. At present, China's rural land system reform and development have reached a new historical juncture. How to concretize the Central Committee's policy that "the implementation of the household contract responsibility system for collective land is a long-term unchanged policy" in the second round of land contracting, realize the long-termization of rural land use rights as soon as possible, and take effective measures to truly protect farmers' land rights and interests and stabilize farmers' long-term expectations, is a key issue related to the sustainable development of China's rural economy and the long-term stability of society.
I. Stabilizing farmers' expectations for land management is the key to resolving the contradictions in China's agricultural and rural economic development, and realizing the long-termization of land use rights is imperative
1. The de facto unstable operation of the household contract responsibility system has become an important factor constraining agricultural and rural economic development, and farmers should be granted long-term and guaranteed land use rights as soon as possible.
Since the founding of New China, China's agricultural and rural economic development has been plagued by three fundamental contradictions: first, the pressure on agricultural product supply brought about by the contradiction between people and land; second, farmers are numerous and poor, with few employment opportunities, making it difficult to increase their income; third, the agricultural foundation is weak, with little investment and insufficient staying power for agricultural development. Since the reform and opening up in 1978, through the transformation of rural production relations, the essence of which is the transformation of the rural land system, especially the land use system, the enthusiasm of farmers for production has been greatly enhanced, the supply of agricultural products has greatly improved, farmers' incomes have increased significantly, long-term investment in agriculture has increased, and the staying power for agricultural development has been strengthened. Not only have the three fundamental contradictions been effectively alleviated, but they have also brought extremely profound impacts on China's economic and social transformation. As a result, the long-term unchanged policy of "implementing the household contract responsibility system for collective land" has won full affirmation at the Central Committee's policy level. However, due to differences in understanding the adaptability and vitality of the household contract responsibility system, as well as deviations in actual operation caused by interest-driven factors, the household contract responsibility system has in fact operated unstably and degenerated in some areas: (1) Since the mid-1980s, doubts arose about whether the household contract responsibility system could adapt to modern socialized large-scale production, and these gradually developed into practical actions to change so-called contradictions such as "diseconomies of scale," "fragmented land," and "small land unsuitable for modern production."
Consequently, in the process of "appropriate scale management," tendencies toward "pooling land together" and unified management appeared in some places.
(2) The land contracting period was short and uncertain, and the Central Committee's relevant policies on stabilizing the household contract responsibility system were not fully and effectively implemented. Most farmers' land use rights had no written contract or no specific description in the contract. Sample surveys showed that only 13% of surveyed farmer households had written contracts for contracted land; less than 1% of farmers had land use right certificates; some places did have written contracts, but the contract contents were quite incomplete, rough both legally and technically. (3) Periodic adjustments to land due to population changes greatly infringed on farmer households' land use rights. Surveys showed that since 1978, the land contracted by farmers had been adjusted on average 3.01 times, and at least more than 60% of villages and 60% of farmer households had experienced land adjustments. (4) Collective agricultural production management, including "cooperative farms," "collective farms," and "company + farmer households," which returned from the so-called needs of scale management, caused the contracting system to degenerate. At the same time, farmers' land use rights and interests were also infringed upon in various forms by rural power figures arbitrarily "terminating contracts," "collectively transferring or leasing," and "taking back land use rights and re-contracting at high prices." (5) The distribution relationship among the state, collectives, and farmers was not straightened out, farmers' burdens were too heavy, and land returns seriously drained away, directly affecting farmers' expectations for managing land. Without protection of rights and interests, stipulating the length of the land contracting period is of little significance. The above situation made farmers doubtful about the Central Committee's policy of extending the contract for another 30 years without change, and the future of land system reform was unclear, affecting farmers' expectations. If thorough reform of the rural economic system, especially the land use system, is not carried out, and farmers' land use rights are not stabilized and guaranteed over the long term, various contradictions in rural economic development may be intensified as a result. There should be a clear understanding of this.
2. The term, breadth, and certainty of land rights are key factors affecting whether farmers make long-term investments in land.
Extending the land contracting period, expanding the connotation of farmers' land use rights, and giving them institutional confirmation and legal protection are the direction of rural land system reform and development. The experience of various countries proves that under any land system, secure land rights are extremely important for economic development. The key to China's agricultural and rural economic development lies in promoting the growth of agricultural investment, thereby increasing land output rates and ensuring stable growth in agricultural product supply and farmers' incomes. China is in the primary stage of socialism for a long time. The rural production relations and productivity conditions determine that fully mobilizing farmer households' enthusiasm for long-term investment in land has become a key element in agricultural and rural economic development. However, because farmers' land use rights in China are in fact short and unstable, and the scope of land use rights is too narrow without legal protection, farmers' enthusiasm for long-term investment in land is not high. From this, one cannot conclude that farmers are unwilling to accept an institutional arrangement for long-term land use rights. Surveys showed that relatively short land use rights, but with a broader and guaranteed scope of rights, can also promote farmers to invest more in land; on the contrary, even if the term of land use rights is (nominally) very long, but lacks protection and has fewer rights contents, it is not easy to guide the growth of agricultural investment. If farmers are granted permanent land use rights, expanding land use rights from a single cultivation right to de facto possession, use, income, distribution, and limited disposal rights, and protecting their rights with institutions and laws, more than 85% of farmer households are willing to accept an institutional arrangement for long-term land use rights and are enthusiastic about long-term investment in land. This shows that under any land system, land rights are not a single right, but a collection of multiple different rights. Therefore, rural land system innovation must make an overall design and arrangement for the term, breadth, and certainty of land rights.
3. The long-term stable psychological needs of farmer households and the continuous adjustments required by collective members' equal possession are the main contradictions in the rural land issue. Therefore, the urgent task is to formulate policies that both satisfy farmers' need for equal rights and allow them to obtain long-term stable land use rights. For the vast majority of farmers in China, agricultural land is their main source of economic income, and they need long-term guaranteed land use rights. At the same time, they also recognize the need for sufficient land to support newly added population. Moreover, in traditional concepts, members of the "collective" should naturally and without distinction enjoy "collectively owned" land, and this concept has been transformed into an institutional arrangement - periodic adjustments that in fact must be carried out as population grows. Farmers indeed encounter a dilemma when choosing policies of land adjustment or non-adjustment. Surveys showed that farmers need both long-term stable land use rights and equal possession of land. Therefore, land system reform and development must balance the relationship between farmers' long-term land use rights and equal possession. A realistic way to resolve this issue is: within the framework of long-term stability of "implementing the household contract responsibility system for collective land," realize innovation in the land system. For example: while defining the subject of property rights, strictly define the boundaries of "collective" members and limit the group entitled to "contracting rights"; before granting farmer households long-term guaranteed land use rights, make a final adjustment to land, and the distribution of land must predict farmer households' future land needs; make long-term plans for the development and distribution use of developable agricultural land resources within the community; and gradually realize the marketization of land adjustments through paid transfer of land use rights, etc. It can be predicted that as China's population trends toward zero growth, the pressure to adjust land will gradually ease. At the same time, as people recognize new land laws and land systems and thereby change their concepts of land possession and use, and can allocate land resources through the market, a new system of long-term farmer land use rights can truly be implemented and can fully embody its cornerstone role in the lasting development of agriculture and rural areas.
4. Seize the opportunity, adopt multiple methods in the second round of land contracting to extend the land contracting period, and steadily transition to long-term land use rights. China's household contract responsibility system was gradually promoted at the policy level. Although periodic adjustments and other actions occurred during this period, this system has nonetheless operated basically stably for 15 years. In a small number of areas, farmers' contracted land was indeed not adjusted during the 15 years. Moreover, in some areas across the country, experiments with 30-year, 50-year, and 70-year unchanged terms are being carried out. Therefore, the long-termization of farmers' land use terms is gradually being recognized at the political and economic levels. At the same time, major contradictions and problems in the operation of the land system have been relatively fully exposed, and in practice much experience has been explored and accumulated to resolve contradictions and problems.
What is particularly important is that, with the deepening of China's rural economic reform and the stable development of rural policies, the most important conditions have been laid for implementing long-term farmer land use rights. From this it can be judged that at present, taking the second round of rural land contracting as an opportunity, the time is ripe for implementing an institutional arrangement for long-term rural land use rights. Seizing this opportunity will greatly accelerate the process of reform and innovation in the rural land system.
II. Taking the second round of land contracting as an opportunity, adapt measures to local conditions, adopt multiple forms, and realize a steady transition to long-term land use rights
5. To implement long-term land use rights, farmer households' land contracting and management rights must have sufficient length and protection, remaining unchanged for at least 50 years, or even 70 years or 100 years. Before the first round of land contracting was about to expire, the Central Committee clearly pointed out that land contracting should be extended for another 30 years without change, and that the contracting period for afforestation land and development-oriented production such as the governance of the "four wastelands" could be longer. In the second round of land contracting work, the Central Committee reiterated once again that stabilizing the land contracting relationship is the core content of the Party's rural policy. "Implementing the household contract responsibility system for collective land is a long-term unchanged policy." Implementing the long-termization of rural land use rights is the concretization and institutionalization of the Central Committee's above policies. The so-called long-termization of land use rights means ensuring that farmer households' land contracting and management rights have sufficient term, breadth, and certainty. The term of land contracting and management rights is the core content of implementing long-term land use rights, and also a key factor in protecting farmers' land rights and stabilizing farmers' long-term expectations. The term of farmers' land use rights must be long enough to at least ensure that they or the next generation can recover their investment. In view of the successful experience of pilot reform areas in rural areas in implementing 30-year and 50-year unchanged land contracting and management, and the successful practices of some areas where the second round of land contracting has already been completed, it should first be stipulated that rural land contracting and management rights remain unchanged for at least 50 years, basically guaranteeing the length of two generations; in view of the effective implementation of the policy of "paid land transfer for 70 years without change" in special economic zones and the eastern coastal areas, consideration may be given to introducing the "70 years without change" policy into rural land contracting and management. For projects and land with long production cycles and development characteristics, the contracting period may be "unchanged for 10 years." Doing so can thoroughly eliminate farmers' worries and greatly enhance farmers' enthusiasm for long-term investment.
6. Adapt measures to local conditions, adopt multiple forms, and realize a steady transition to long-term land use rights. At present, all parts of the country are carrying out the second round of land contracting work on the basis of the first round of 15-year land contracting successively expiring. Therefore, this opportunity should be seized, and in response to different situations in different places, multiple forms should be adopted to realize the transition to long-term rural land use rights. First, for areas that have already carried out "land contracting unchanged for 30 years," generally speaking, in order to maintain policy continuity, the 30-year contract should be kept unchanged and extended after expiration. However, if the vast number of farmer households have strong demands and conditions in all aspects are relatively mature, they should also be allowed to extend from 30 years unchanged to 50 or 70 years unchanged; for areas that have not yet carried out the second round of land contracting work, wherever basic conditions are mature, the long-term land use rights system should be supported and encouraged, corresponding contracts should be formulated and signed, and realization should be achieved in one step; for many pilot areas across the country, all pilot plans that conform to the long-term land use rights policy should remain unchanged. Second, allow different types of land to implement different contracting periods. For example, basic farmland may implement a 50-year term, sloping land may remain unchanged for 70 years, and the development and use rights of the four wastelands may implement even longer terms, thereby stabilizing farmers' long-term expectations and enhancing their enthusiasm for long-term investment in land. Third, allow different areas to implement different land contracting periods. For example, underdeveloped areas in the central and western regions, due to fewer non-agricultural employment opportunities, need to implement a longer-term land contracting system. Fourth, for areas with relatively large regional differences, allow the implementation of "one place, two systems" under the premise of "30 years unchanged," implementing different contracting periods within the area; some rural areas may use 30 years, while others may use 50 years or 70 years.
7. Poor areas in the central and western regions should be allowed to take the lead in implementing the long-term land use rights policy. Compared with the more developed eastern coastal areas, land has special significance for farmers in the central and western regions, especially poor areas in the central and western regions. Land is not only the most important factor of production, but also the main social security for farmers. Under the premise of stabilizing the household contract responsibility system, taking the lead in implementing the long-term land use rights policy in poor areas in the central and western regions is likely to win the support and endorsement of the vast number of farmer households, reduce the cost and risk of implementation, and is also likely to mobilize farmers' enthusiasm for production and investment, forming the foundation for rural economic development and social stability in the central and western regions. This is an important measure that achieves multiple benefits at once.