Government bottom-line coverage is a phenomenon in China's rural social conflict management

Preface

Sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf believes that social conflict is a state of struggle, competition, dispute and tension between social forces outside the government that are clearly antagonistic. At present, China is in a period of social transformation, society is further differentiating, the subjects and sources of social interests are becoming more diversified, interest relationships are becoming more complex, and interest contradictions are gradually becoming more obvious, forming an extremely complex new pattern of interests and a new system of social contradictions. Struggles and conflicts triggered by interest games and rights defense among different individuals, groups and strata are particularly prominent, and social conflicts are breaking out in a concentrated manner. The control and management of social conflict has become an important topic in the fields of public governance and social management in China. Due to historical and social reasons, the government is the most important subject in China's social conflict management. In the process of social conflict management, the government is a non-party, playing the role of third-party intervention between the two sides of the conflict, and bearing the responsibility of building a communication platform for both sides, facilitating reconciliation and reaching compromise, and ultimately resolving the conflict and restoring social order.

However, in reality the government's role and responsibility are far from being so simple. The government is not only not a fair, impartial and authoritative intermediary and arbiter in social conflict management, but is often the object of "extortion" by one or both sides of the conflict, a soft persimmon specially picked out by all parties to squeeze. Researchers have found that when the government, as a third party, mediates among the parties to a conflict, it provides compensation in order to resolve the contradiction between the direct parties to the conflict, so as to calm the situation and end the dispute. The so-called "profit-seeking petitioning" is likewise the case: farmers petition over civil disputes, the government gives benefits to the petitioners in order to calm the petitioning, and after receiving the benefits the petitioners continuously petition or threaten to petition, using this to coerce the government into granting benefits. Other studies have found that in various "blow-up" phenomena, the parties to the conflict pressure the government by blowing the matter up so that their own matters can be resolved, and the way of resolution is mostly to obtain benefits from the government. In "school bus incidents" in various places, the amounts of government bottom-line coverage have risen wave after wave, with neither precedent nor norm, which is lamentable and even deplorable, all for the purpose of getting local governments off the hot seat as quickly as possible. In the "Yichang Bridge collapse" incident in Henan at the beginning of the year, the local government, in order to shift the focus of public opinion and settle the victims and calm the incident as soon as possible, even let out the words "the earlier you sign the agreement, the more rewards you get," making government bottom-line coverage even more naked. Some scholars summarize this phenomenon, in which the government openly or implicitly provides certain benefits in exchange for people's acceptance of the social order, as "bottom-line coverage," and the government is reduced to a "bottom-line-covering mediator."

According to the author's investigation, in rural social conflict management, the bottom-line coverage phenomenon of grassroots governments is even more commonplace, and has even become a general phenomenon in rural social conflict management. In addition, the author found that before the government provides bottom-line coverage, there must necessarily be a process of farmers "blowing things up." In other words, grassroots governments will not consciously, automatically and willingly provide bottom-line coverage for either side in a rural conflict; only when the government perceives that bottom-line coverage is necessary will it do so. "Big disturbances bring big solutions, small disturbances bring small solutions, no disturbance brings no solution." Blowing a matter up is the best way to make the government perceive the need to solve the problem through bottom-line coverage. Farmers casually blow matters up, and grassroots governments have no choice but to provide bottom-line coverage. Therefore, farmers blowing things up and government bottom-line coverage are twin brothers, a dual construction of the relationship between farmers and the government in rural social conflict management. Farmers blowing things up is the premise, and government bottom-line coverage is the result. Each follows a different logic, and together they shape the unique phenomenon of rural social conflict management.

Then, when the government manages rural social conflicts and mediates among them, why do one or both sides of the conflict blow things up? As a non-party to the conflict and a third party with no direct relationship, why does the government provide bottom-line coverage for the conflict? These are the questions this article attempts to initially answer. This article first defines government bottom-line coverage, then analyzes the logic of farmers blowing things up as its premise, and next explores the internal logic, mechanisms and roots of government bottom-line coverage. Finally, it analyzes the political and social consequences of farmers blowing things up and government bottom-line coverage, and conducts preliminary discussion and elevation.

I. Cases of "Government Bottom-Line Coverage"

Before elaborating in detail on government bottom-line coverage management, several cases of government bottom-line coverage from rural investigations in Anyi County, Jiangxi, are listed here. Through the presentation of these cases, one can glimpse the general phenomenon and logic of "government bottom-line coverage" in rural social conflict management.

Case 1 In 2010, villager Liu Mou of Gucun in Shi Town was killed by a motor tricycle. The county traffic police brigade went to the scene to handle the accident, but Liu's relatives paid no attention to the county traffic police brigade at all. Liu's relatives adopted a disturbance-petitioning strategy, carrying Liu's corpse to the road section where the accident occurred, and later to the county party committee compound, where they set up a mourning hall. Finally, under the coordination of the county political and legal affairs commission, Liu's relatives received 300,000 yuan in compensation: the perpetrator compensated 280,000 yuan, the Jin Town government where the perpetrator was located compensated 10,000 yuan, and Shi Town where Liu was located compensated 10,000 yuan.

Case 2 In May 2011, two people in Xin Town were hit by Wang Mou of Shibi Town while he was driving a motorcycle, resulting in one death and one injury. The families of the deceased and injured demanded 200,000 yuan in compensation, but Wang simply could not produce that much money. The families of the deceased and injured then went to the Shi Town government carrying the corpse and creating a disturbance-petition, paralyzing the town government's office order. The county leaders came forward to mediate, but to no avail. Finally it alarmed the municipal government, and a deputy mayor came down to mediate. In the end, this deputy mayor made the final decision: Shi Town would compensate 50,000 yuan, Xin Town would compensate 50,000 yuan, and the perpetrator Wan Mou would borrow money to compensate 100,000 yuan.

Case 3 In 2010, Yang Xiheng's wife had her ureter cut during a hysterectomy at Anyi County People's Hospital. Yang Xiheng demanded that the hospital compensate, bear follow-up treatment costs and pay compensation for emotional distress. The doctor and patient sides disagreed over the amount of compensation. Yang Xiheng and his relatives petitioned the county and municipal governments many times without result. Later, Yang Xiheng gathered more than 30 people to sit in and create a disturbance-petition at the county government gate, and the director of the county petition bureau came out to placate them. The county's final mediation opinion was: Anyi County People's Hospital would bear the follow-up treatment costs for Yang Xiheng's wife and compensate 30,000 yuan, and the town government would issue a consolation payment of 40,000 yuan.

Case 4 In 2012, a man in his 20s from a village in Shi Town accidentally fell into a reservoir while fishing and drowned. The reservoir was located in Shi Town but was managed by the county water conservancy bureau. The deceased's family could not find a responsible party, so they carried the corpse to the gate of Shi Town and created a disturbance-petition, eating, drinking, defecating, sleeping and living entirely at the town government. The town government said the reservoir was not under its management, and the reservoir management side said there were explicit regulations prohibiting fishing, that the deceased had been fishing in violation of the rules, and that the deceased's death had nothing to do with it, so neither agreed to the deceased's family's compensation demands. After all parties deadlocked for some time, the deceased's family threatened to carry the corpse to the county to create a disturbance. Later an agreement was reached: the reservoir management side, the county water conservancy bureau, compensated 30,000 yuan, the town government paid a consolation payment of 30,000 yuan, and the deceased's village contributed 40,000 yuan. Half a year later, the deceased's parents petitioned the county several more times, demanding that their living difficulties be resolved. The town government continuously received their petitions and, unable to bear the disturbances, arranged urban minimum livelihood guarantees separately for the deceased's parents.

Case 5 In October 2010, Liu Kebing, a student at Shi Town No. 2 Middle School, fought with classmates Liu Xingxing, Liu Xin and others. Liu Kebing's lung was pierced by Liu Xingxing with a fruit knife, and he died after rescue efforts failed. Liu Kebing's parents and relatives went many times to the school and the county petition bureau to create disturbance-petitions, carrying the deceased's portrait and burning paper and setting off firecrackers in front of the teaching building and in the classroom. Only after six days and five nights of continuous mediation by many people, including the county political and legal affairs commission secretary, the discipline inspection commission secretary, the deputy county head, the county education, science, culture and sports bureau director, the county public security bureau deputy director and the town party committee secretary, was a compromise reached: the deceased's family received 450,000 yuan in compensation; Liu Xingxing's guardian compensated 180,000 yuan; Liu Xin's guardian compensated 120,000 yuan; Shi Town No. 2 Middle School compensated 130,000 yuan; and the Shi Town government paid a consolation payment of 20,000 yuan.

Case 6 In 2011, Yang Mou's father in a village in Ping Township was critically ill and was carried to the village clinic for treatment. The village doctor believed the condition was serious and advised the family to transfer him to Yangmei Town Hospital for treatment as soon as possible. When they arrived at the town hospital, before the doctor had time to conduct a consultation, Yang Mou's father died. In order to obtain compensation from the hospital, Yang Mou's family insisted that the hospital's failure to treat in time had caused the patient's death, and gathered dozens of young people with the same surname and clan from the village to make trouble at the hospital. The hospital believed it bore no responsibility and was unwilling to bear compensation, and the hospital director likewise gathered dozens of able-bodied young laborers from his hometown to confront Yang Mou and his group. In order to avoid a mass conflict, the Yangmei Town government and Ping Township government came forward to mediate, but after three days there was no result, and neither side was willing to compromise. In the end, the two township governments each gave Yang Mou 6,000 yuan, totaling 12,000 yuan in consolation money, and Ping Township also arranged a minimum livelihood guarantee for Yang Mou's elderly mother, allowing the conflict to be calmed.

Case 7 In 2011, He Mou of He Village, in his 60s, one day let his cattle eat vegetables from He Er's family and was scolded by He Er's wife. Unconvinced, he went home and drank poison to commit suicide. This person was himself afflicted with illness and had several times quarreled with others and threatened to drink poison to kill himself, but each time had been talked out of it by his family. After he succeeded in drinking poison and killing himself this time, the village quickly reported it to the town. The town party committee and government responded quickly, and the deputy secretary in charge of political and legal affairs and several leaders went down to the countryside to handle the matter, taking seven consecutive days and nights to resolve it. He Mou's family demanded that He Er's family compensate 100,000 yuan for funeral expenses and other costs. He Er's family believed that He Mou's cattle had eaten the vegetables and that he was in the wrong first, that they had only said a few words, that He Mou's drinking poison had little to do with them, and moreover that He Mou had tried to drink poison several times before and had long prepared the poison, so they were willing to pay only funeral expenses and would not pay any other costs. The two families deadlocked. Although the town and village initially failed in their efforts, they controlled the situation, and He Mou's descendants did not carry the corpse out to create a disturbance-petition. Finally, under the coordination of the town government, He Er's family compensated He Mou's family 40,000 yuan, and the town government gave He Mou's family another 30,000 yuan in the form of a consolation payment. Both sides signed and affixed their fingerprints, expressing agreement with the handling opinion and promising not to petition or lodge complaints.

The author's investigations in rural areas such as Anyi, Jiangxi, found that no matter the reason, as long as someone dies while being treated at a hospital, or a traffic accident occurs, people will seek out the government, and the government must come forward and provide compensation; otherwise they will block the government gate, or even go to a higher-level government for mass petitioning. Traffic accidents can no longer be handled by the traffic police, but must be handled by the political and legal affairs commission. At present, disturbance-petitioning by rural masses has become the biggest local problem. As long as someone dies, even if they died in a fight among themselves, they will still seek out the government to make trouble. Whenever there is a death, there is trouble. Now the underworld has intervened in death incidents; the underworld helps you plan, operates it industrially, and takes over demanding government compensation, splitting the compensation. For 200,000, they want 50,000. They march in the streets for 50 yuan a day and a pack of cigarettes. Now it is the people "bullying" the officials, and there is a lack of reverence for the law. For any matter, old men and old women are mobilized to block the government gate; kindly and respectable-looking old women block the government gate for 50 yuan a day.

II. Definition of "Government Bottom-Line Coverage"

(1) The connotation of "government bottom-line coverage"

Government bottom-line coverage refers to the situation in which, in conflicts among social subjects, the government intervenes as a third-party force to manage the social conflict, and when the parties to the conflict fail to reach a compromise and attribute their dissatisfaction to the government's mediation and turn the spearhead of the conflict toward the government, the government, in order to control as quickly as possible the ever-escalating situation, compensates one or all parties to the conflict in the form of interests or other benefits, providing bottom-line coverage for the conflict so that the parties accept the political and social order supplied by the government. In social conflict management, the nature of government bottom-line coverage is, in the final analysis, "spending money to buy peace," resolving the conflict by giving benefits to the parties rather than making a ruling according to law, policy, principles and precedent, or through persuasive education. According to the above definition and nature, government bottom-line coverage has the following distinct characteristics: First, the government is the mediator and third-party intervener among the parties to the social conflict, not a party to the conflict; second, government bottom-line coverage occurs after the parties to the conflict (may) turn the spearhead of the conflict toward the government and continuously blow the matter up, that is, the sign of government bottom-line coverage is that the social conflict (may) transform into a grassroots political incident, and government bottom-line coverage is in essence paying the bill for a political incident that (may) draw fire onto oneself; third, after weighing the opportunity cost of conflict management, the government judges that only interest-based bottom-line coverage can "as quickly as possible" end the dispute and restore social order, and that any other path will prolong the situation and cause the government to pay a higher price; fourth, the method of government bottom-line coverage is mostly the direct output of benefits, giving advantages, rather than following principles and norms.

By classifying government bottom-line coverage, it can be better understood. According to different classification standards, government bottom-line coverage has the following main types:

1. According to differences in the government's subjective initiative and attitude toward bottom-line coverage, it can be divided into active bottom-line coverage and passive bottom-line coverage. The former is when, before farmers have blown the matter up or threatened to blow it up, the government judges that the two sides of the conflict will find it difficult to reach a compromise, and that if the matter is not resolved quickly it will trigger even greater trouble, so it makes a decision to provide bottom-line coverage. The latter refers to the situation in which one or both sides of the conflict, unable to reach a compromise, blow the matter up, placing the government under pressure from higher-level government or public opinion so that it has no choice but to make a bottom-line coverage decision in order to resolve the matter as quickly as possible. In such a situation, if bottom-line coverage is not provided, the matter will be difficult to resolve quickly, and the government will sink even deeper into the political vortex.

2. According to differences in the number of times the government provides bottom-line coverage in a single social conflict, it can be divided into one-time bottom-line coverage and multiple bottom-line coverage. One-time bottom-line coverage means that the government, in conflict management, provides bottom-line coverage to one or both sides of the conflict once, thereby resolving the conflict, with no subsequent social conflict or blow-up incident occurring afterward; while multiple bottom-line coverage means that after the government's first bottom-line coverage, one or both sides of the conflict are dissatisfied with the benefits received and the handling result, and therefore stir up another blow-up incident, or that after tasting the sweetness of government bottom-line coverage, the parties imitate the previous blow-up behavior to pressure the government and obtain benefits again or continuously. Multiple instances of government bottom-line coverage become a source for farmers to seek profits by blowing things up.

3. According to the number of levels of government participating in bottom-line coverage in a single conflict management, bottom-line coverage can be divided into single-level bottom-line coverage and multi-level bottom-line coverage. Single-level bottom-line coverage means that one level of government bears the responsibility for bottom-line coverage, with its superior and subordinate governments not participating; such bottom-line coverage often occurs in social conflict management of smaller scale and narrower impact. Single-level bottom-line coverage occurs more often in conflict management by township governments. Multi-level bottom-line coverage means that multiple levels of government organizations bear the responsibility for bottom-line coverage, and the forms or items of bottom-line coverage by governments and departments at different levels may be the same or different; such bottom-line coverage generally occurs in social conflict management of larger scale and broader impact. Multi-level bottom-line coverage occurs more often within county areas, typically in county-level mass incidents, which are generally covered at the bottom line separately by the county-level government and relevant departments, and by township and village-level organizations.

(2) Manifestations of "government bottom-line coverage"

The manifestations of "government bottom-line coverage" refer to the aspects of rural social conflict in which the government conducts bottom-line coverage management. In rural social conflict, not all conflicts require government bottom-line coverage management. Some conflicts can be resolved autonomously within the countryside, some conflicts can be well resolved through government mediation, but some conflicts easily develop to the point of requiring government bottom-line coverage, and the government's "bottom-line coverage" is mostly manifested in the management of these conflicts.

1. Conflicts between farmers and enterprises, institutions, and self-governing units. In rural areas, public institutions mainly include rural primary and secondary schools, kindergartens, health centers, clinics, agricultural technology and agricultural materials departments, post offices, power supply stations, etc.; enterprises mainly refer to collective enterprises run at the township and village levels; and self-governing units include village committees, community organizations, etc. These units and organizations are not government departments, or have already separated from government departments. Collective enterprises are units responsible for their own profits and losses. Public institutions are some public welfare units and non-public welfare functional departments whose main purpose is government functions and public welfare services. They participate in the management of social affairs and perform management and service functions, with the purpose of serving society, and are mainly engaged in education, science and technology, culture, health and other activities. Self-governing units, by contrast, are farmers' self-governing organizations, produced through election by farmers with voting rights. Although these units and organizations are not government departments, they share one common point, namely that they possess a public character. Because of their public nature, in farmers' eyes they are government departments, and when farmers come into conflict with them, it is easier for farmers to escalate the conflict to the government and demand that the government resolve it, and the government bears greater responsibility for intervening in such conflicts. Among these conflicts, the main ones requiring government bottom-line coverage management are the following: (1) Casualty accidents in primary and secondary schools and kindergartens. The causes of such accidents may be fights and brawls among students, accidental incidents occurring while students are at school (such as drowning while swimming), or accidental deaths during class (such as sudden death from shock in physical education class), etc. In recent years, the one that has attracted more attention is the rural school bus accident. (2) Medical accidents occurring when farmers seek medical treatment at rural hospitals and clinics; such accidents easily trigger the common "medical disturbance" phenomenon. (3) Conflicts between farmers and village committees (communities) or village cadres. Such matters generally arise from infringement of farmers' rights and interests by village committees or village cadres, or from interests not being satisfied, or from the breaking of notions of fairness and the common-sense sense of justice, causing the latter's dissatisfaction, which is then exploited and organized by village political struggles and triggers fierce conflict; a more typical example is the "Wukan incident." Other conflicts include mass conflicts triggered by widespread "fake seeds" and "fake pesticides" incidents, conflicts between farmers who die from electric shock and power supply departments, and individual or mass conflicts triggered by farmers' dissatisfaction with collective enterprises over pollution, treatment, work injury compensation, etc., and so on.

2. Civil public security disputes involving casualties. If the above conflicts between farmers and enterprises, institutions, self-governing units and other subjects still possess a certain public character and are still inextricably linked to the government in farmers' minds, then the fact that conflicts among purely civil subjects also require government bottom-line coverage is somewhat bizarre, but in fact the government's bottom-line coverage management of such conflicts is quite astonishing. Such conflicts generally include the following situations: (1) Civil disputes causing casualties or mass confrontations, such as fights causing injury or accidental death, or individual civil conflicts triggering mass confrontations between different villages or clans. (2) Quarrels among farmers in which one party uses suicide as a means or dies in a fit of anger, causing fierce conflict among the family relatives and clans of both sides, with the government intervening in conflict management. Such conflicts occur from time to time in rural areas. (3) Farmers accidentally drowning, leading to conflict between the relatives of the drowned person and the owner or manager of the water surface; accidents of drowning while fishing, swimming, playing in the water or accidentally falling into the water often occur in rural areas. Originally such accidents are due to one's own reasons and have nothing to do with the owner or manager of the water surface, still less with the government, but because the relatives of the deceased seek an explanation and compensation from the water surface manager or owner, disputes and conflicts between the two sides arise, and the government intervenes in conflict management. (4) Conflicts between farming households and developers or demolition companies in land expropriation and housing demolition. Recently there have been repeated reports of farming households being crushed to death by bulldozers or rubber-tired road rollers of developers or demolition companies while preventing land expropriation and development. According to the author's investigation, in these accidents the injured party generally directs the conflict toward the government, ultimately turning it into a conflict with the government, and the local government provides bottom-line coverage in conflict management.

3. Traffic and other accidents involving casualties. According to regulations and convention, the unit handling traffic accidents is generally the transportation department, and local party committees and governments only assist in handling them. But during fieldwork, when we heard that Liu Mou in Case 1 died in a traffic accident and the traffic police department did not even appear, we were very surprised. Later we went specifically to the traffic police brigade for research, and Section Chief Chen of the accident section accepted our interview. He said: "Going there is useless; neither side in a traffic accident will recognize the accident determination of the traffic police brigade. Now the accident section has nothing to do. When a traffic accident occurs, people go directly to the party committee and government." Because of distrust of the traffic police department, and because compensation as desired cannot be obtained according to law and regulations, the handling of rural traffic accidents has become a matter for township party committees and governments and county political and legal affairs commissions, with the traffic police brigade only assisting with technical work such as appraisals. In such conflicts, because neither side compromises and the casualty side makes a big disturbance, local governments often calm the conflict through bottom-line coverage management.

4. Petitioning and mass incidents. According to the provisions of Article 41 of the Constitution, petitioning is a basic right of Chinese citizens, and is also one of the ways farmers seek resolution of many disputes and expression of demands. When local governments and courts find it difficult to satisfy farmers' appeal demands, and at the same time there are no other relationships that can settle the matter, the most stubborn people adopt various petitioning methods, such as persistent petitioning, disturbance petitioning, skipping-level petitioning and petitioning in Beijing. Persistent petitioning refers to petitioners constantly pestering local party and government leaders and department leaders, demanding that they solve problems and satisfy demands, interfering with leaders' ability to do other things, making leaders extremely annoyed and highly likely to give some benefits to settle the matter, especially in cases where the petitioning itself is for profit. Disturbance petitioning refers to demanders demanding problem resolution by creating individual or mass disturbances at party and government organs. Skipping-level petitioning and petitioning in Beijing refer to farmers, when lower-level governments cannot satisfy their demands or solve their problems, skipping levels to report problems to higher-level governments or the central government. Under the "one-vote veto system" for petitioning and the stability-maintenance pressure system, in order to eliminate local unstable factors and petitioning incidents (especially skipping-level petitioning and petitioning in Beijing), local governments easily adopt the method of "using renminbi to resolve contradictions among the people" to settle petitions. Among the types of petitioning under government bottom-line coverage management, petitioning involving law and litigation is relatively typical. According to investigations, most petitioners involving law and litigation are dissatisfied with the court's final judgment but do not meet the conditions for retrial, and therefore petition level by level up to Beijing. Many cases have already been legally concluded. Local courts have no legal fault, and local governments, which originally had nothing to do with civil cases, are even less at fault. It is only because of petitioning that local governments are compelled to become involved in the coordination of civil disputes, to negotiate with petitioners, and possibly to conduct bottom-line coverage management in order to end the petitioning. There are also petitions, sit-ins and marches by specific occupational groups such as veterans, privately run teachers, former village cadres, former barefoot doctors, government reassigned personnel, and laid-off personnel. The causes of their struggles and demands are originally unrelated to the faults of local governments, but their resistance behavior becomes an important part of local government stability maintenance, and generally requires measures such as creating special policies and treatment for them and "buying off" leaders to provide bottom-line coverage management.

In the more intense mass incidents of social conflict in rural areas, the local government's bottom-line coverage management is reflected even more clearly and thoroughly. According to the author's investigation, many rural mass incidents are not directed at the local government at the outset, but may originally be civil conflicts (such as conflicts between two clans, or contradictions between a buyer and a merchant). It is only because the government uses the wrong methods when intervening in conflict management (such as careless police dispatch or inappropriate remarks), or because the two sides of the conflict are dissatisfied with the government's mediation decision, that conflict with the government is triggered, and people unrelated to the original conflict also join in to "vent anger." In such mass incidents, which involve a wide range of people and have enormous impact, the government may tend to calm the situation as quickly as possible, placate the populace and dissolve public opinion pressure through bottom-line coverage management.

(3) Forms of "government bottom-line coverage"

The forms of "government bottom-line coverage" refer to the ways in which the government, and the resources it mobilizes, conducts bottom-line coverage management of rural social conflict. According to the author's investigation, there are generally three forms of government bottom-line coverage: first, interest-based bottom-line coverage; second, policy-based bottom-line coverage; and third, political bottom-line coverage. According to differences in the nature, scale and demands of different conflicts, the government adopts different forms of bottom-line coverage. Sometimes one form is used to resolve the problem, while sometimes a combination of all three forms is needed to thoroughly calm the conflict. For example, in the "Weng'an incident," the government adopted a comprehensive form of bottom-line coverage: donations from the education department, economic subsidies and grain subsidies provided by the township government where the deceased was located, minimum livelihood guarantee treatment for the elderly in the family, and agreement to provide poor-student financial assistance for the deceased's elder brother during university, etc.

1. Interest-based bottom-line coverage. According to the nature of different conflicts or the demands of the parties, the government directly pays a certain amount of money or material subsidy to the parties to the conflict. In the 7 cases listed above, the government in bottom-line coverage management gave the parties varying degrees of monetary subsidies, generally in the name of "consolation," "assistance," "comfort," or "subsidy." These names and discourses conform both to the public's "moral" demands on the government and to the ideological concepts of the socialist state and government of "serving the people" and satisfying the needs of people in difficulty. In persuading and settling petitions, township or county civil affairs bureaus will give petitioners benefits in the name of "serious illness assistance" or "extreme poverty subsidy" so as to make them settle their petitions. Of course, there are also cases in which benefits are given directly without any name or justification, for example when local governments, in the process of receiving petitioners, put them up in the best hotels, provide high-end food and drink for free, let them tour scenic spots, fly them back, etc., and privately promise other benefits. In resolving mass conflicts with greater impact, the government also calms villagers' resentment toward the government by giving benefits to most villagers. For example, after the "Wukan incident" was calmed, on April 18, 2012, Zhu Mingguo, deputy secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, inspected work in Wukan and promised to solve many difficulties and problems affecting villagers' production and life. The purpose of this move was to further eliminate villagers' resistance sentiment and gain recognition for the government's actions.

2. Policy-based bottom-line coverage. This includes three aspects. (1) Lowering thresholds or applicable conditions so that certain parties can enjoy a certain treatment or policy. The granting of minimum livelihood guarantees in Case 7 listed above is relatively typical: originally the mother of the person involved did not meet the minimum livelihood guarantee requirements, but in order to calm the conflict, the requirements were lowered to include her in the rural minimum livelihood guarantee ranks. Others, such as urban minimum livelihood guarantees, economic subsidies, hardship subsidies, grain and oil subsidies, seed subsidies, and poor-student subsidies, all require adjusting relevant regulations before they can be given to the parties to the conflict. In addition, phenomena such as arranging admission to county middle schools by breaking through score lines, arranging employment or job transfers by breaking through regulations, as well as tax preferences and assistance for self-employment, are also not uncommon. Treatment and policies of this kind have already commonly existed as means of rural governance for farmers' petitioning and social conflict. (2) Creating some special policy texts, using "normative" forms to enable parties to disputes in certain situations to obtain special subsidies of a specific degree and scope. For example, many local governments have issued regulations similar to the "Measures for the Management and Use of Special Funds for Judicial Assistance," aimed at assisting parties in petition cases involving law and litigation who have living difficulties, stipulating that as long as they meet the conditions, poor parties can receive assistance funds of up to 50,000 yuan. In Anyi County, Jiangxi, where the author conducted investigations, because disturbance-petitioning incidents over traffic accidents have recently been relatively frequent, relevant regulations on fund payment have also been issued. In conflict management involving specific occupational groups (such as highly organized veterans), the creation and updating of policies is even more frequent. (3) Giving special policy assistance and support to the parties to the conflict or the villages in conflict. This mainly applies to post-conflict management of mass incidents with relatively large impact and high social attention, and is both a measure to placate villagers and a need to establish models and new typical examples of conflict resolution. Examples include the "Weng'an incident" and the "Wukan incident." After the "Wukan incident," on April 20, 2012, the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee work group listed a summary table of supporting and assisting construction projects for Wukan Village's infrastructure facilities in 2012. There were more than a dozen projects needing construction or rectification, involving the renovation of tap water supply facilities, village road construction, village residential greening, repair of sewage pipelines, Wukan teachers' residential building, etc., with project costs of nearly 100 million. The Guangdong Provincial Party Committee decided to build Wukan into a new highlight demonstration area for contiguous rural environmental improvement, and established a leading group for Wukan Village's new socialist countryside construction and project advancement, hiring well-known urban and rural construction planning experts from Guangdong Province to carry out high-starting-point, all-round planning. After experiencing mass petitioning, confrontation between officials and the people, and high-level intervention, the Wukan incident will enter the public view as a demonstration village for new socialist countryside construction.

3. Political bottom-line coverage. Making political compromises to satisfy the parties' demands regarding village politics. The author's investigation found that after farmers turn social conflict into conflict with the government, they use non-compromise or blowing things up to coerce the government into resolving other problems, such as resolving party membership status, running for village committee election, appointment as village or group cadres, removal of currently serving village cadres, restoration of political reputation, and re-election. This type of bottom-line coverage is relatively prominent in social conflicts of village factional politics. In mass conflicts, "political bottom-line coverage" also includes judicial organs not pursuing the legal responsibility of the main persons who created the conflict, and pursuing the political responsibility of the relevant main responsible persons of local governments. The "Wukan incident" is a typical case that originated in village factional political struggle and finally triggered large-scale conflict between the masses and the government due to improper intervention by the police and government. In this incident, the opposition raised three demands: investigate the land sale situation clearly; investigate the village committee election situation clearly; and make village affairs and financial conditions public. In order to calm the incident as quickly as possible, on January 15, 2012, on the proposal of the Guangdong Provincial work group, Wukan Village established a new general party branch, with opposition member Lin Zuluan serving as village party general branch secretary. Then on February 1, Wukan Village held a villagers' committee election, and all 11 committee members produced were opposition members. On March 3, Wukan Village's fifth villagers' committee held a re-election, and Lin Zuluan was elected village committee director in the first round with a high vote of 6,205 votes, while fellow opposition member Yang Semao was elected deputy director with 3,609 votes. On March 4, Wukan Village conducted a supplementary election of the villagers' committee. After the supplementary election, opposition member Hong Ruichao was elected deputy director of the villagers' committee, and other main opposition members Zhuang Liehong, Zhang Jiancheng, Sun Wenliang and Chen Suzhuang were elected villagers' committee members. On April 20, the Shanwei City Lufeng Discipline Inspection Commission announced that it would subject a total of 8 members of Wukan Village's original party committee and village committee to "shuanggui" and stated that it would seriously investigate and punish their violations of law and discipline. At this point, in the village factional political struggle, the opposition completely took control of village power, the original village two committees cadres stepped down and were punished, and the wave of opposition from the opposition and the villagers behind it receded.