Favoring the rich instead of helping the poor betrays the original intent of targeted poverty alleviation
On the one hand, people who are obviously wealthy and should not be assisted are identified as poverty alleviation targets; on the other hand, a large amount of poverty alleviation funds is left sitting idle in accounts rather than being used to help those who are truly poor. Behind the seemingly chaotic poverty alleviation logic of Mashan County are actually tangled interests, a disregard for laws and regulations, and a mentality of lazy governance.
Recently, an announcement issued by the National Audit Office showed that in Mashan County, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, and a few other areas, the implementation of targeted poverty alleviation work was inadequate, poverty alleviation funds were not allocated in a timely manner, or poverty alleviation targets were improperly identified. Among the poverty alleviation targets identified in the county, 3,119 people did not meet the criteria for poverty registration, including 343 people who were financially supported by the government, 2,454 people who had purchased 2,645 cars, 43 people who had bought commercial housing or built their own homes in the county seat, and 439 people who were self-employed or ran companies. In addition to falsifying poverty alleviation targets, the county also identified 2,272 people whose per capita net income still fell short of the national poverty alleviation standard as having been lifted out of poverty. This falsely reported portion accounted for 9% of the poverty alleviation task.
In addition, as of the end of July, the county's special account for fiscal poverty alleviation funds had a carryover balance of 92.3414 million yuan, accounting for 43.73% of the county's public fiscal revenue in 2014, of which 70.5614 million yuan was carried over from 2014 and previous years, causing the progress of multiple poverty alleviation projects to be limited.
The misuse of poverty alleviation funds, "favoring the rich instead of helping the poor," and falsely reporting poverty alleviation progress are not only a problem of the efficiency of fiscal poverty alleviation funds, but also, more seriously, a violation of the interests of local people and a deprivation of their opportunity to escape the cycle of poverty. Poverty alleviation funds are money to support the poor, the life-saving money of the most impoverished people, and also the "seed money" for them to move toward a better life. When Mashan, Guangxi, uses poverty alleviation funds to relieve more than 3,000 "rich people," in a certain sense it also means that an equal number of poor people may have lost the opportunity to receive relief.
On the one hand, people who are obviously wealthy and should not be assisted are identified as poverty alleviation targets; on the other hand, a large amount of poverty alleviation funds is left sitting idle in accounts rather than being used to help those who are truly poor. Then, in order to make achievements look good, 2,272 truly poor people were falsely reported as having been lifted out of poverty. If failing to accurately identify poverty is a problem of capability, it is still understandable. But deliberate falsification is clearly a problem of attitude and absolutely unacceptable. Behind the seemingly chaotic poverty alleviation logic of Mashan County are actually tangled interests, a disregard for laws and regulations, and a mentality of lazy governance.
Whether for county and township governments or for individual farming households, the "label" of poverty means fiscal funds and development opportunities. For people who have long lived in economically backward areas, this is a strong incentive of interest. In the process of identifying poverty at the grassroots level, there is room for impersonation or scrambling for the "label" of poverty. When some people compete for the "label" of poverty, they use illegal and irregular means to crowd out the development opportunities of truly poor farmers. For those who are selfish and lacking in a sense of justice, "even the smallest mosquito is still meat," and the cost of violating laws and regulations is very low, while corresponding supervision and review are lacking, so regardless of the size of the benefit, they seize it first. Pursuing interests is understandable, but one must not crowd out the development opportunities of poor farming households.
Poverty alleviation and development is a systematic project: the targets must be accurate, the projects must be accurate, the funds must be accurate, the measures must be accurate, the personnel assigned must be accurate, and the poverty exit must be accurate. In the entire process of targeted poverty alleviation, the identification of poverty alleviation targets is the first step of all poverty alleviation projects and is crucial to achieving targeted poverty alleviation. If deviations in measures, funds, projects, and other processes amount to a discount on targeted poverty alleviation, then deviations at the step of target identification directly shake the foundation of poverty alleviation and development.
Because of the complexity of income statistics and the heavy workload of household surveys, it is impossible to achieve 100% accurate identification, but as long as the operational process for identifying poor people is strictly followed, at least the results should not be too far off. Yet Mashan County included people who owned cars, could buy homes in the county seat, and were financially supported by the government among those to be assisted. Its process for identifying poverty alleviation targets was absurd beyond measure.
In addition to the "double falsification" in poverty alleviation achievements and poverty alleviation targets, the incentive problems in the work of Mashan County's poverty alleviation department exposed this time also deserve attention. Relevant departments would rather leave large amounts of poverty alleviation funds sitting idle in accounts than use the money to support the truly poor people who need assistance. The crux of the problem is that local governments did not truly perform their duties and fulfill their responsibilities. Not only did they fail to implement a strong screening and supervision mechanism, they even regarded poverty alleviation as an "extra matter." This phenomenon of targeted "non-alleviation" is both a dereliction and abandonment of duty and also carries suspicion of lazy and inactive governance. Although some places no longer assess officials by GDP, in the dominant view of achievements in most poor counties, poverty alleviation can only be regarded as a minor detail. If more than 70 million poor people are to be lifted out of poverty entirely within 6 years, how to raise the enthusiasm of poverty alleviation workers in poor areas must also be fully considered.
After the audit exposure, the State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development responded that "as long as the interests of ordinary people are violated, it will never be let go," and organized an investigation team to investigate in Mashan County. In fact, before the audit results were published, Lu Jian, director of the county's poverty alleviation office, had already been held accountable for suspected bribery that caused losses to the state. Since the beginning of this year, 12 relevant responsible persons in Mashan County have been held accountable for inadequate targeted poverty alleviation.
The investigation into the Mashan poverty alleviation incident is still ongoing. In addition to holding relevant responsible persons accountable, the wealthy people who pretend to be poor households to defraud national fiscal poverty alleviation funds must not be tolerated either. Through various means such as condemnation by public opinion, entry into personal credit records, and legislative penalties in a future "Poverty Alleviation Law," the economic and moral costs of pretending to be poor households should be increased. On the other hand, it is also necessary to continue strengthening the technical forms of accurate poverty identification, develop more poverty alleviation projects that reach households and suit poor farming households, innovate poverty alleviation project management models, and introduce more poor farming households and social forces into poverty alleviation projects to form a co-management mechanism for poverty alleviation funds and projects.