Breaking contracts and abandoning farmland: why has land transfer hit a wall?

Although a 10-year land transfer contract was just signed last year, more than 250 mu of farmland belonging to villagers in Beilangbao Village, Cheng'an County, was still subject to contract breach and abandonment by the land-contracting “boss.”

In early April, reporters interviewing rural areas in Xingtai, Handan and other places in Hebei found that the phenomenon of “breaking contracts and abandoning farmland” in land transfer had appeared in many places.—Last year, 5-year and 10-year “land contracting contracts” had just been signed with farmers, but this year the land transferees unilaterally terminated the contracts and forcibly returned the farmland. The area involved reached over a thousand mu and involved numerous farming households, amounting to a small-scale “earthquake” locally.

Experts point out that today's highly frequent phenomenon of “breaking contracts and abandoning farmland” is precisely caused by the “ability to compete for land but no ability to farm” exposed in recent years during the process of capital going to the countryside to farm. As downward pressure on the economy increases, “breaking contracts and abandoning farmland” is only the beginning.

⟦NL> The wheat seedlings in the surrounding plots have grown about a chi tall, but because of “breaking contracts and abandoning farmland,” more than 70 mu of farmland belonging to villagers in Neisan Village, Baixiang County, has become overgrown with weeds and turned into pasture for a shepherd from a neighboring village to graze sheep.

The report said that some “bosses” holding large amounts of urban industrial and commercial capital, in order to compete for land, raised the local land rent from 400 yuan per mu to 1200 yuan-1400 yuan per mu, with some even as high as 1680 yuan per mu. After acquiring land at such high rent, some people did not understand farming at all and planted crops with low economic returns such as sweet potatoes, Chinese cabbage, and radishes. As a result, after losing money “left and right,” they had no choice but to “break contracts and abandon farmland.”

Exploring the causes

At present, the causes of “breaking contracts and abandoning farmland” in rural transferred land are many-sided, and the following main problems have been exposed in practice:

First, land transfer lacks a long-term binding mechanism, with poor management decision-making and inadequate operational supervision, causing many attractive promises to come to nothing and making matters highly arbitrary; in some places in Hebei where “breaking contracts and abandoning farmland” occurred, the local agriculture administrative authorities knew nothing about the scale, price, or use of local land transfer. It can be said that it was precisely the absence of local agriculture administrative authorities that magnified the blindness of “bosses” competing in agriculture, ultimately causing capital to lose money and hurting farmers and agriculture.

Second, some investors are keen on contracting land and capital going to the countryside to seek opportunities for profit, extracting agricultural subsidies and grants, causing short-term agricultural production input and poor sustainability;

Third, the foundation for land transfer operations is weak, with many places facing shortcomings in infrastructure, and comprehensive improvement of “fields, water, roads, forests, and villages” not being carried out in place, causing low agricultural production efficiency and weak competitiveness;

Fourth, large-scale land operations are deeply affected by market fluctuations, and the environment for modern agricultural development is fragile, with high risk.

Plain language everyone can understand

They only know how to spend money to rent land, not how to make money. A year's harvest is not even as high as the land rent, so how can this business be done? (Planting one season each of wheat and corn, after deducting various costs, the “net profit” is only 1000 yuan. Boss Li of the Rulin Vegetable Planting Farmers' Professional Cooperative in Cheng'an County, Handan City, contracted 1000 mu of land last year at 1000 yuan/mu, and now has lost 1 million.)

Too much money invested, too little money earned. If you plant radishes and spinach, the prices of radishes and spinach fall, and the selling price per jin is not even as high as the labor cost, so the vegetables cannot even be harvested. How can you avoid losing money? (Zhinfarm Vegetable Planting Professional Cooperative in Baixiang County, Xingtai, transferred 7400 mu of land last year to plant radishes. Last year, 1 jin of radishes sold for two or three mao, and the labor cost of harvesting 1 jin of radishes was more than that price. A huge loss!)

Fine wine and bitter fruit are both brewed by oneself. Industrial and commercial capital is not short of money, and it acts generously and boldly. Seeing others all “enclosing land,” they cannot resist acting too, but once the land is in hand, how can it generate value? (In Houpeili Village, Xinyi Township, Cheng'an County, Handan City, land was transferred by a wealthy boss to build a leisure farm, and the “Mongolian camp” set up has no one coming to spend money……)

How to solve it?

This requires strengthening risk control for land contracting contracts, setting access “thresholds,” and establishing operational “rules” to ensure that capital truly participating in large-scale grain production enters land transfer. Most importantly, the government must fulfill its responsibilities; statutory duties must be performed.

To ensure that the government is not absent in land transfer, local governments should strengthen supervision of agriculture administrative authorities according to law, require them to effectively perform their duties, guide, coordinate, manage, and supervise rural land transfer work, guide orderly rural land transfer, and promote the healthy development of appropriately scaled agricultural operations.

If “breaking contracts and abandoning farmland” is caused by the absence of agriculture administrative authorities, the responsibility of the relevant responsible persons should be pursued according to law, thereby forcing them to actively perform their duties.