H7N9 outbreak strikes, the first line of defense at the national border falls
Due to work and family reasons, I have frequently traveled back and forth among various Asian countries over the past few years.
The day before yesterday, H7N9 had already entered Taiwan, China. This news was not surprising, yet it filled one with much reflection!
I deeply feel that, compared with neighboring countries, Taiwan, China's front-line epidemic prevention is truly too weak!
In order to block the invasion of contamination sources, every country regards its airport as the first checkpoint in the battle against epidemics.
Therefore, every country places "disinfection mats" at its airports, so that travelers arriving from all over the world, when stepping into the country,
can undergo the first stage of disinfection and epidemic prevention work.
Laying out disinfection mats does not require especially profound knowledge or professional skill, and of course Taiwan, China has also set up disinfection mats at its airports.
However, the placement, quantity and method of use of Taiwan, China's disinfection mats are merely a perfunctory gesture,
and the epidemic prevention effect they can achieve is almost zero!
1. The disinfection mats are placed in the wrong location!
After inbound travelers get off the plane and pass through the jet bridge, they step into the boarding gate.
In other words, when they cross the boarding gate, they have already entered the scope of the country's territory.
Therefore, if disinfection and epidemic prevention work is to be carried out at the earliest possible moment, the disinfection mats should be placed in front of and behind the boarding gate;
all travelers must step across the disinfection mat before they can enter the passenger hall.
Yet Taiwan, China places its disinfection mats in front of the disinfection and quarantine station.
Everyone knows that from the boarding gate to the disinfection and quarantine station at Taoyuan Airport,
there is a distance of at least 100-200 m or more, and this stretch of space becomes a blind spot in epidemic prevention.
At the same time, airport staff will direct travelers to pass slowly over the disinfection mats,
so that the disinfectant seeping from the mats can fully wet the crevices of shoe soles and the wheels of suitcases,
effectively isolating unspecified viruses or bacteria on shoe soles before the arrivals hall,
and further avoiding cross-contamination among travelers from different countries.
Airport staff in South Korea know how to make full use of the functions that disinfection mats should have, but Taiwan, China's disinfection mats are always dry,
which clearly shows that the amount of disinfectant used is severely insufficient, and it simply cannot block the viruses and bacteria on travelers' shoe soles and suitcase wheels.
In other words, this method of use achieves no epidemic prevention effect at all.
Even more noteworthy is that Taiwan, China is still using a very outdated grade of disinfectant.
Disinfectants are regarded abroad as "chemicals," but in Taiwan, China they are classified as "veterinary drugs.
According to relevant regulations in Taiwan, China, veterinary drugs must submit relevant animal experiment data to prove their stability before they can be legally marketed and sold.
However, there is not a single disinfectant factory in the world that can provide animal experiment data.
Under such circumstances, the Taiwan, China market can only sell disinfectant products from decades ago.
In recent years, various disinfectant products with stronger efficacy and greater environmental friendliness have long been developed abroad,
but due to Taiwan, China's rigid regulatory system, they have no chance to be marketed there.
Likewise, Taiwan, China's airports can only continue to use outdated disinfectant products, and the results of epidemic prevention are greatly reduced.
4. Specific personnel are not controlled at all
Once an avian influenza outbreak occurs, those most likely to come into contact with the virus should be veterinarians and personnel serving in livestock-related industries.
Japan and South Korea both keep registered lists and controls for this group of people. After entry and exit, airport staff wait on site after customs clearance,
and conduct a simple inquiry into travel history, while also disinfecting their entire bodies and luggage!
My wife herself is a veterinarian in South Korea, and every time she enters or leaves South Korea she is taken into a sealed disinfection room to undergo disinfection work.
And I myself, as a family member of a veterinarian and also serving in the livestock industry, am now listed by the South Korean government as one of the persons subject to disinfection.
In addition, South Korean farmers are also among those subject to registered lists and controls! To avoid infecting the livestock at home with the virus and causing economic losses, disinfection work is truly indispensable.
Keeping registered lists and controls is not difficult, yet it can greatly increase the tightness of the epidemic prevention safety net.
In fact, such a list has long existed in Taiwan, China; it only needs to be updated and proofread in real time to be put to use,
but the relevant units seem to have forgotten the importance of keeping registered lists and controls for veterinarians and livestock industry personnel, and our
line of defense against epidemics has therefore developed a loophole.
The battle against epidemics depends on the supporting and coordinated operation of every link; not one can be missing.
Facing avian influenza viruses introduced from abroad, the focus of the battle against epidemics should first be placed on the movement of inbound and outbound personnel.
But in its front-line airport epidemic prevention work, Taiwan, China has already shown many careless omissions,
and just how much epidemic prevention effect it can produce is something one cannot help but doubt.
Let us take the 2003 SARS incident as an example. At that time, Taiwan, China had 307 cases and 47 deaths;
yet South Korea, whose airport epidemic prevention is far stricter than Taiwan, China's, had only 3 suspected infection cases.
The importance and effect of airport work is beyond doubt!
H7N9 is certainly frightening, but compared with other various epidemic prevention measures,
the front-end airport epidemic prevention work is instead a more basic and more important first line of defense.