The Upstream and Downstream Journey of Maleic Acid from Factory to Table
Tainted starch spreads across Taiwan, yet every operator found to have sold or used illegal ingredients cries innocence. On the 24th, Mingji Douhua was exposed for using a douhua ingredient (sweet potato starch) that contained maleic acid; oddly enough, the owner of Mingji confirmed that the upstream supplier held a passing SGS test before making the purchase. In this incident, many operators claim to be victims. Where exactly does the problem lie? Using Mingji Douhua as an example, News&Market traces the flow of food ingredients and, through the operators' own accounts, identifies the current loopholes in food management. (Click any role in the diagram below to see the operator's account)
From factory to dining table: the upstream and downstream journey of maleic acid
A. UPC Chemical, Hsin Chang Chemical: chemical raw material producers
Role: chemical industry operator, producing maleic acid and other chemical raw materials.
B. Guanxiang Chemical: chemical raw material trader
Role: imports and exports chemical raw materials, including maleic acid, for use across industries. Industries served include: chemical raw materials, dyeing and finishing materials, food ingredients, pharmaceutical ingredients, cosmetic ingredients, detergent ingredients, solvents, and dyes.
C. Sanjin Flour Industry: food ingredient supplier
Role: buys maleic acid from upstream Guanxiang Chemical and mixes it into starch.
Operator's account:
I knew I was buying chemical raw materials, but maleic acid is not toxic (editor's note: maleic acid has low acute toxicity, but animal studies have shown it can cause organ damage), it is simply not approved by the government. The EU and the US both allow its use (editor's note: EU regulations only permit its use in indirect food packaging materials), the government's rules are unclear and should follow the EU in establishing permitted-use regulations (editor's note: the EU does not allow it to be added to food). Being seized and fined, I am very unhappy about it. Of the 21 modified starches now approved by the government, many are more toxic than maleic acid.
D. Yihe Flour Factory: major distributor trading in starch
Role: buys starch from upstream Sanjin Flour Industry, then sells it to minor distributors.
Operator's account:
After we buy from upstream, we do not repackage it at all, and previously we would not proactively send it for testing. Only if a downstream operator needs a test report would we ask Sanjin (Flour Industry) for one. But in the starch specification sheet, only sulfur dioxide, total bacterial count, moisture and so on are tested; maleic acid is not within the approved scope. I am a victim too, but after this time, I will definitely test it myself.
We are just a distributor; the Department of Health never inspected us in the past. I heard the Department of Health inspects downstream, but that is also just checking whether the ingredients used have additive permits, the sanitary environment and so on.
Actually, back in April, word got around in the industry that starch contained maleic acid; after May, all flour was shipped only after passing testing; later, when I learned my flour had a problem, I hurriedly notified downstream operators to recall it. The Xiqing flour found in Mingji's case may be stock that was not recalled earlier. The government should manage the starch factories well, otherwise downstream is in big trouble.
E. Daqutian Trading Firm: minor distributor trading in starch
Role: buys starch from upstream "Yihe Flour Factory" and sells it at retail.
Operator's account:
We are a minor distributor, Yihe is a major distributor, we have been selling for over ten years. This time, although "Yihe" showed a test report free of maleic acid, the batch sent for testing may have been a different batch from the one sold to Mingji. Yihe did notify us to recall, but did not say it very clearly; the bag sold to Mingji may have been mixed with earlier stock. In fact, as long as upstream is managed well, we would not have problems.
The health bureau mainly does spot checks on finished products on the market; before this incident we had never been spot-checked. Only if a customer needs a report would we get one from upstream; Mingji, for example, requires a test report for every monthly purchase. Basically, we trust the upstream operators, and with so many items, how could we possibly test each one ourselves? The testing cost is even more than the product. But from now on, when we buy flour, we will require the upstream operator to provide a test report.
F. Mingji Douhua: food manufacturer
Role: buys the needed starch (sweet potato starch) from "Daqutian" Trading Firm as a partial ingredient for making douhua.
Operator's account:
We have worked with Daqutian for over 20 years, and specifically instructed the owner to find us the best ingredients. On 5/2 we received the SGS test report free of maleic acid, and only then did we make the purchase the next day; even something with an SGS report free of maleic acid had a problem. Where on earth can you buy legal ingredients?
Our ingredients all have test reports, and the finished products are also tested. Our downstream channels are very strict, testing for pesticide residues, preservatives, bleach and so on, and the health bureau also does spot checks from time to time, but all of these test finished products, not ingredients. We already gatekeep so strictly, but if something is adulterated indiscriminately, we still do not know where to begin testing; the government must gatekeep upstream well.
From chemical raw materials to food, how should it be controlled?
A single sweet potato starch must pass through 6 checkpoints before it can become food, and the most important role of all is Sanjin Flour Industry. Its upstream is industrial raw material suppliers, and its downstream is food distributors, which amounts to buying maleic acid with the left hand and mixing it into starch with the right hand to sell as a "food ingredient"; it is clearly producing an illegal food additive, yet still selling it under the name "food ingredient". But Taiwan has no agency tracking the flow of chemical raw materials, nor does it restrict who may purchase chemical raw materials.
After half a month, the Department of Health finally promised to control chemical raw materials entering food; in the future, if chemical industry operators sell industrial raw materials to food manufacturers, they must bear joint liability. But will chemical industry operators and food manufacturers resell through third-party intermediaries? Who will supervise and manage it? This remains a very big problem.
In addition, modified starch is a food additive, and the Department of Health stresses that in the future it will mandatorily register "food additive manufacturers" in order to track flows. Yet in the food chain described above, not one of the 6 checkpoints is registered as a food additive manufacturer; the Department of Health regards Sanjin Flour Industry as merely a "food ingredient supplier", and therefore, when local health bureaus conduct inspections, they focus only on the sanitary environment and seldom spot-check ingredients, making it hard to prevent abuses.
With many loopholes upstream and test certificates unable to guarantee that what is bought is legal and healthy, it is likely hard to erase consumers' doubts; even if the Department of Health increases penalties, whether it can effectively stop the problem remains to be seen; the fundamental solution is still to establish a complete management mechanism and truly track the flow of food, so that similar incidents can be prevented from recurring again and again.
Tainted starch spreads, Taichung meatballs and fenguo also affected