Do not blame migratory birds for the epidemic: Taiwan Animal Society Research Association's January 26 response to the Bureau of Animal and Plant Health Inspection and Quarantine statement

Last Tuesday (the 20th), our association held a press conference titled "Where do the new and old H5N2, H5N3, and H5N8 avian influenza viruses, as well as the H9N2-positive antibodies detected in chickens at slaughterhouses, come from? We ask the government to present scientific evidence and stop readily blaming migratory birds, which creates gaps in disease prevention." We invited Professor Chin Chuan-chun of the Institute of Epidemiology and Preventive Medicine, College of Public Health, National Taiwan University, to attend and explain the report she co-authored with the team of Professor Guan Yi of the University of Hong Kong, China.

The report states: From 2012 to 2013, the research team collected feces and blood from chickens and ducks at a slaughterhouse in northern Taiwan, China, and conducted virus and serological surveillance respectively. They found that the surface genes of 16 strains of H5N2 virus from chickens came from the 2003 H5N2 virus, which can be traced back to a Mexican H5N2 vaccine strain; 80% of chicken blood samples tested positive for H9N2 antibodies, some even at high titers (1280), but H9N2 virus had never been detected in Taiwan, China before, and the government must explain this clearly to the public.

On the 21st, the Bureau of Animal and Plant Health Inspection and Quarantine (BAPHIQ) of the Council of Agriculture not only stated that it would continue to clarify whether operators were illegally using vaccines, but also emphasized that it had used the same virus strains and experimental methods as Professor Chin Chuan-chun to conduct sampling and testing and found no abnormal antibodies. It also said the differing results would be published in a journal paper, effectively challenging Professor Chin's research findings.

Scientific research should of course be subject to verification, and our association welcomes the government's publication of its differing surveillance results. However, because the sampling targets in both studies were live poultry wholesale markets, where the poultry come from multiple farms, and because the sampling times differed and the source farms were different, the so-called differing results of BAPHIQ's research are unlikely to refute the research findings of Professor Chin's team.

Moreover, after Professor Chin's research was published, BAPHIQ's research conducted in 2014 also isolated what is now called the old local H5N2 avian influenza virus (see press release), and also found low positive rates of H9N2 avian influenza antibodies in chicken serum (see press release).

Since the H9N2 land-based avian influenza virus has never been isolated in Taiwan, China, where did this virus come from? Why do chickens produce antibodies against the H9N2 avian influenza virus that does not exist locally in Taiwan, China? BAPHIQ and the Animal Health Research Institute have a responsibility to clarify and resolve these doubts as soon as possible.

In addition, on the same day, BAPHIQ also rarely issued a statement titled "Academic research should comply with biosafety and not pose risks to the public." It accused Professor Chin of handling viruses without authorization and, between 2012 and 2013, "transporting virus-containing specimens to Hong Kong, China without authorization," "violating Taiwan, China's management of infectious biological materials," and "exposing relevant personnel to risk," thereby causing "international doubts about our country's rigor in virus transport management and seriously harming our country's image." It therefore said that "the Council of Agriculture refuses to cooperate with Professor Chin again, and after investigation confirmed a violation of Article 36 of the Statute for Prevention and Control of Infectious Animal Diseases, imposed a fine of 20,000 yuan."

Because this involves a biosafety management controversy, our association believes that BAPHIQ must present concrete evidence. Otherwise, it is effectively eliminating dissenting voices at all costs in order to continue blaming the epidemic on migratory birds that cannot speak, and even using biosafety as a pretext to suppress academic freedom, which harms our international image even more.

Also, on the 22nd, BAPHIQ stated that it had initially completed comparison of the eight gene segments of the H5N2 and H5N8 avian influenza viruses from ducks and geese, noting that H5 and N8 were most similar to the 2014 Korean duck H5N8 virus, N2 was most similar to the H5N2 virus of wild birds in Xianghai, Jilin, China, and the other 6 gene segments were each most closely related to virus strains isolated in China, Japan, and Korea, among other places. It therefore once again emphasized that "the novel avian influenza is a newly invaded virus strain" and "was not produced by the evolution of Taiwan's influenza virus strains."

On the 24th, BAPHIQ responded to requests from scholars and civil groups and published the amino acid sequences and gene comparison results of the novel H5N2 and H5N8 viruses. Our association believes that BAPHIQ only published the viral amino acid sequences and did not publish the nucleic acid sequences, so its information is not comprehensive enough. It can only be known that the virus is currently still limited to transmission among poultry (the Centers for Disease Control of the Ministry of Health and Welfare analyzed gene sequences such as PB2, HA, and NA and concluded that its risk of infecting humans is far lower than H7N9, and that oseltamivir treatment is still effective), and which viruses in which countries it is relatively close to, but it cannot fully explain the origins and evolution of the virus (by drawing a phylogenetic tree to prove the source).

Our association once again calls on the Animal Health Research Institute to publish the amino acid and nucleic acid sequences of all avian influenza viruses from past years (including viruses detected in migratory birds) to the public database of the National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI), so as to facilitate research on virus information by all sectors.

Although the virus is currently limited to poultry, it has already spread from waterfowl such as geese and ducks to landfowl such as chickens and turkeys. Other landfowl (such as quail) that are susceptible hosts of avian influenza should also be actively investigated. It is recommended that the Council of Agriculture require farms raising various animals at the local level to proactively provide samples to academic units capable of testing for sample testing, to confirm that other poultry are safe and prevent undetonated avian influenza bombs. This can also reduce the testing burden on the Animal Health Research Institute.

Learning from the past to guide the future, our association once again calls on the government to:

(1) Thoroughly review the farm and migratory bird virus and serum surveillance networks and mechanisms. This will help establish complete background information and further clarify how and when the various novel viruses in this epidemic evolved or infected Taiwan's poultry farms.

(2) Establish a surveillance network and mechanism for syndromes in economic animals. Like humans, economic animals will more or less show symptoms when sick, such as decreased egg production and increased mortality. But after all, there are many species and huge numbers, and monitoring their life course is far more complex than the mechanisms of human birth, aging, illness, and death. How to establish an effective syndrome network and mechanism requires pooling collective wisdom.

(3) Based on the "shared disease" nature of humans and non-human animals, as well as "One Health," research, especially on emerging animal diseases, should be opened to participation by both human medical and veterinary academic units. Through long-term research and experience sharing, cultivate capacity and manpower for emergency epidemic response.