How can the village affairs supervisory committee effectively strengthen democratic supervision?
The village affairs supervisory committee can effectively strengthen democratic supervision
(Agricultural Wealth Network) In 2007, the Discipline Inspection Commission of Jiaoling County, Meizhou City, Guangdong Province, piloted the "village affairs supervisory committee" system in Fangxin Village of that county, and the following year piloted the villager convening group system. Together with the villagers' assembly and the villagers' representative assembly, a village-level power balance structure gradually took shape.
The village-level power balance structure established by the Jiaoling County Discipline Inspection Commission on a pilot basis in Fangxin Village consists of the village affairs supervisory committee, the villager convening group, the villagers' representative assembly and the villagers' assembly. The supervisory committee is composed of 5 supervisors, made up of the village's "three olds," namely old cadres, old model workers and old Party members, democratically recommended and produced through the villagers' representative meeting, corresponding to the village's 5 natural villages, and mainly responsible for supervising the village committee and village cadres; the villager convening group is also composed of 5 members, elected from among all villagers' representatives, and mainly convenes the villagers' assembly or villagers' representative assembly, equivalent to a standing body of the villagers' representative assembly.
According to the provisions of the Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees, China implements the system of villagers' self-governance, the core content of which is democratic election, democratic management, democratic decision-making and democratic supervision. However, democratic supervision, which plays a safeguarding role, has often become the weakest link and the one least able to function effectively. It is common for village officials to become corrupt because their power is not supervised, which has seriously eroded the government's credibility. It is easy to elect village officials but difficult to recall them, which is also a difficult problem in the implementation of the Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees. Forming a power balance structure is clearly conducive to solving these problems.
Building a village-level power balance structure undoubtedly has many benefits. First, it helps strengthen democratic supervision. When the village Party secretary and the village committee director are mostly the same person holding both posts, the drawbacks of "the village chief having sole power" are obvious, while the absence of supervision at the same level and the lack of supervision from higher levels also exist. A survey by the Jiaoling County Discipline Inspection Commission showed that 63% of villagers believed that "it is impossible for villagers of the village to supervise village cadres," because "the strength of villagers is not strong" and "they are afraid of offending village cadres." The supervisory committee is different. On the one hand, they have prestige and the villagers trust them; on the other hand, they have fewer misgivings when supervising, dare to speak up, and are not afraid of offending village cadres. At the same time, it can also solve the problem of higher-level discipline inspection commissions having limited energy and being unable to reach far. Second, it can move the supervision threshold forward. Although the village affairs supervisory committee has solved the problem of after-the-fact supervision, can it prevent corrupt behavior by village cadres in decision-making beforehand and turn "after-the-fact supervision" into "advance prevention"? The work of the convening group is precisely to inform villagers in advance of the topics for convening the villagers' assembly or villagers' representative assembly, extensively collect villagers' opinions, and "make it possible for all village affairs to be decided democratically." For some corrupt or inactive village cadres, the convening group can also initiate recall procedures. In addition, it promotes the building of anti-corruption and integrity at the grassroots level. In recent years, due to rural land expropriation, an increase in infrastructure construction projects, the development of village-level enterprises, various compensation from national and local governments, and the allocation of poverty alleviation funds, corrupt phenomena such as interception and embezzlement by a small number of village cadres have occurred frequently, and have caused intensified contradictions between cadres and the masses and an increase in villagers' petition incidents. Building a village-level power balance structure is clearly conducive to curbing the occurrence of corruption such as "small officials committing major embezzlement" and promoting the healthy development of various rural undertakings.
Building a new socialist countryside requires not only actively developing the rural economy and guiding farmers onto the path of escaping poverty and becoming prosperous, but also vigorously strengthening the building of democratic politics. This is precisely the significance of the attempt by the Jiaoling County Discipline Inspection Commission in Fangxin Village to build a village-level power balance structure by establishing a village affairs supervisory committee and a villager convening group. Their practice is worth considering and learning from in all regions.
The village-level power balance structure established by the Jiaoling County Discipline Inspection Commission on a pilot basis in Fangxin Village consists of the village affairs supervisory committee, the villager convening group, the villagers' representative assembly and the villagers' assembly. The supervisory committee is composed of 5 supervisors, made up of the village's "three olds," namely old cadres, old model workers and old Party members, democratically recommended and produced through the villagers' representative meeting, corresponding to the village's 5 natural villages, and mainly responsible for supervising the village committee and village cadres; the villager convening group is also composed of 5 members, elected from among all villagers' representatives, and mainly convenes the villagers' assembly or villagers' representative assembly, equivalent to a standing body of the villagers' representative assembly.
According to the provisions of the Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees, China implements the system of villagers' self-governance, the core content of which is democratic election, democratic management, democratic decision-making and democratic supervision. However, democratic supervision, which plays a safeguarding role, has often become the weakest link and the one least able to function effectively. It is common for village officials to become corrupt because their power is not supervised, which has seriously eroded the government's credibility. It is easy to elect village officials but difficult to recall them, which is also a difficult problem in the implementation of the Organic Law of the Villagers' Committees. Forming a power balance structure is clearly conducive to solving these problems.
Building a village-level power balance structure undoubtedly has many benefits. First, it helps strengthen democratic supervision. When the village Party secretary and the village committee director are mostly the same person holding both posts, the drawbacks of "the village chief having sole power" are obvious, while the absence of supervision at the same level and the lack of supervision from higher levels also exist. A survey by the Jiaoling County Discipline Inspection Commission showed that 63% of villagers believed that "it is impossible for villagers of the village to supervise village cadres," because "the strength of villagers is not strong" and "they are afraid of offending village cadres." The supervisory committee is different. On the one hand, they have prestige and the villagers trust them; on the other hand, they have fewer misgivings when supervising, dare to speak up, and are not afraid of offending village cadres. At the same time, it can also solve the problem of higher-level discipline inspection commissions having limited energy and being unable to reach far. Second, it can move the supervision threshold forward. Although the village affairs supervisory committee has solved the problem of after-the-fact supervision, can it prevent corrupt behavior by village cadres in decision-making beforehand and turn "after-the-fact supervision" into "advance prevention"? The work of the convening group is precisely to inform villagers in advance of the topics for convening the villagers' assembly or villagers' representative assembly, extensively collect villagers' opinions, and "make it possible for all village affairs to be decided democratically." For some corrupt or inactive village cadres, the convening group can also initiate recall procedures. In addition, it promotes the building of anti-corruption and integrity at the grassroots level. In recent years, due to rural land expropriation, an increase in infrastructure construction projects, the development of village-level enterprises, various compensation from national and local governments, and the allocation of poverty alleviation funds, corrupt phenomena such as interception and embezzlement by a small number of village cadres have occurred frequently, and have caused intensified contradictions between cadres and the masses and an increase in villagers' petition incidents. Building a village-level power balance structure is clearly conducive to curbing the occurrence of corruption such as "small officials committing major embezzlement" and promoting the healthy development of various rural undertakings.
Building a new socialist countryside requires not only actively developing the rural economy and guiding farmers onto the path of escaping poverty and becoming prosperous, but also vigorously strengthening the building of democratic politics. This is precisely the significance of the attempt by the Jiaoling County Discipline Inspection Commission in Fangxin Village to build a village-level power balance structure by establishing a village affairs supervisory committee and a villager convening group. Their practice is worth considering and learning from in all regions.