Why county officials serving concurrently as village officials does more harm than good
County officials concurrently serving as "village officials" does more harm than good
(Agricultural Wealth Network) In Zhongxian County, Chongqing, the county Party secretary, the county head, and 28 city-managed officials from the county Party committee, people's congress, government, and political consultative conference each concurrently serve as Party secretaries of 28 rural joint Party committees. It is claimed that this is an exploration to establish "six major systems," including an organizational setup for urban-rural co-development. (Chongqing Evening News, November 10) According to the report, this measure has been highly effective, and the people in the villages concerned welcome this form of co-development. However, the drawbacks brought by this form of co-development cannot be ignored either. It can easily lead to confusion in officials' job responsibilities and may also lead to substantive unfairness.
First, this measure easily confuses officials' job responsibilities. On the one hand, it adds work outside the scope of their own functions onto city-managed officials, which may affect the performance of their own work duties. Moreover, the result of adding another "mother-in-law" is that it objectively deprives village officials of their work rights, which is not conducive to the performance of village officials' own functions.
This measure also arguably adds an extra level of grassroots organization without authorization. This so-called "joint Party committee" is responsible for managing 2 to 4 village-level Party organizations. So how should this "joint Party committee" be defined? Does it accept the direct leadership of the county Party committee, or does it accept the leadership of the local township Party committee?
In addition, it may also lead to de facto unfairness. Because the position is concurrent, city-managed officials are very likely to tilt the power in their hands toward the villages where they hold concurrent posts. For a village-level organization, some problems that are usually difficult to solve can become easy under the attention of city-managed officials. This is an indisputable fact, and this is probably also why villagers like this kind of concurrent post. But what about other villages?
If every official could conscientiously perform their duties and do practical things and seek benefits for the people, why would they need to concurrently serve as village officials?
First, this measure easily confuses officials' job responsibilities. On the one hand, it adds work outside the scope of their own functions onto city-managed officials, which may affect the performance of their own work duties. Moreover, the result of adding another "mother-in-law" is that it objectively deprives village officials of their work rights, which is not conducive to the performance of village officials' own functions.
This measure also arguably adds an extra level of grassroots organization without authorization. This so-called "joint Party committee" is responsible for managing 2 to 4 village-level Party organizations. So how should this "joint Party committee" be defined? Does it accept the direct leadership of the county Party committee, or does it accept the leadership of the local township Party committee?
In addition, it may also lead to de facto unfairness. Because the position is concurrent, city-managed officials are very likely to tilt the power in their hands toward the villages where they hold concurrent posts. For a village-level organization, some problems that are usually difficult to solve can become easy under the attention of city-managed officials. This is an indisputable fact, and this is probably also why villagers like this kind of concurrent post. But what about other villages?
If every official could conscientiously perform their duties and do practical things and seek benefits for the people, why would they need to concurrently serve as village officials?