Bananas and oranges unsold, they turn to China, becoming a sacrifice of policy procurement under the trade war
Text / Jiao Jun (author of the book "Fruit Politics")
Foreword: In 2005, the "Lian-Hu meeting" thawed cross-strait relations, creating a boom in Taiwanese fruit sales to China; the boom-and-bust political procurement brought multiple effects on Taiwan's agriculture. In 2019, China's agricultural political trade war against Taiwan started again. How should Taiwan respond? "Upstream and Downstream" invites experts to analyze, and the special series will continue to be published. To read the series of articles, please click here.
Bananas and oranges unsold, the KMT-CCP platform launches policy procurement
Let us turn the scene back ten years, that is, the moment when cross-strait agricultural exchanges became brisk after the Lian-Hu meeting, and also the backdrop of the first wave of Taiwanese businessmen rushing in droves to "sell fruit": in 2008 the Kuomintang regained power, and at the end of the same year an oversupply and unsold stock of oranges occurred, and the KMT-CCP platform launched policy procurement of Taiwanese agricultural products suffering from oversupply and unsold stock.
The procurement quantity signed at that time was 3,000 metric tons. The executing unit on the Taiwan side was Taipei Agricultural Products Marketing Co., Ltd., and on the other side were members under the All China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives, that is, the official and private "fruit companies" in various places.
In the end, less than 3,000 metric tons of oranges were sold, and the following year (2010) brought another oversupply and unsold stock of bananas (see the table below for output), so both sides continued the contract to use up this procurement quota. This largest-ever policy procurement of Taiwanese fruit was the origin that opened the way for subsequent policy procurement of various types of Taiwanese goods!
The sale of oranges to China, regarded as a "touchstone", got off to a bad start
Along both sides of Provincial Highway 3 in Tainan and Chiayi, extending all the way to Gukeng in Yunlin, was once the largest orange-producing area, and it still is today, except that more farmers, under the guidance of agricultural authorities, have switched to growing Murcott tangors; and Murcott tangors unexpectedly became another hot product for export to the Chinese market, though this no longer has anything to do with policy procurement.
What is interesting about oranges is that, in the first large-scale policy procurement launched by the KMT-CCP platform, they were treated as a very important "touchstone"; Chen Wu-hsiung, then chairman of the Council of Agriculture, personally took charge, and "ministerial-level" units on the other side such as the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Commerce, and the All China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives also paid close attention to this first procurement; however, under the dual influence of domestic production and marketing adjustment and "the Chinese side not knowing how to sell oranges", this procurement figure of 3,000 metric tons ended with actual exports of about 1,300 metric tons.
The orange variety was never originally a "product suitable for export", not because Taiwan's oranges are not good enough, but because there are too many choices among foreign "citrus" products. This strain of Taiwanese orange is not a main export variety, and is very unfamiliar to foreign buyers.
The concealed failure of banana procurement, "dealing with politics" sacrifices farmers' rights and interests
From a commercial standard, the policy procurement of bananas can be called a thoroughly failed trade act; the buyer could not make money, the seller could not obtain market channels, and the government and executing units took the blame. This lose-lose-lose situation only gradually surfaced and became known to the general public after public opinion turned around entirely in 2014.
However, the grand export drama of oranges and bananas proved the grand strategic goal set by the Chinese side's Taiwan affairs system from the very beginning: propaganda above all! As for the substantive side afterward, in the end it can only be said that no one on the Taiwan side seriously thought about how to use this opportunity to truly open up the market; when everyone was merely "dealing with politics", the farmers' rights and interests were naturally set aside by both sides! (The special series is to be continued)